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WILLFUL BLINDNESS: FEDERAL AGENCIES’
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REGULATORY
FLEXIBILITY ACT’S PERIODIC REVIEW
REQUIREMENT—AND CURRENT PROPOSALS
TO INVIGORATE THE ACT
Michael R. See ∗

I.

INTRODUCTION

We live in the age of the bureaucracy. Whether we realize it or not,
federal agencies regulate every aspect of our daily lives, including: the
cloth in our beds; 1 the fuel for our cars; 2 the way we are paid; 3 and the
ingredients in the food we eat. 4 The federal administrative system has the
power to dictate to American business how things are done and officials
have not hesitated to exercise their power. Recognizing that this wideranging power comes with responsibility, Congress passed the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (RFA) in 1980 5 to ensure that regulators take into account
the individual rights of ordinary small businessmen and women while
∗

Michael See is a federal regulatory attorney with the American Petroleum Institute in
Washington, D.C. Prior to joining API, Mr. See served for four years as Assistant Chief
Counsel for Advocacy for the U.S. Small Business Administration where he oversaw
compliance by federal agencies with the Regulatory Flexibility Act. The views expressed in
this article are his alone, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the American
Petroleum Institute, the Office of Advocacy or the Small Business Administration.
1. See, e.g., Standard for the Flammability (Open Flame) of Mattress Sets, 71 Fed.
Reg. 13,472 (Mar. 15, 2006) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1633).
2. See, e.g., Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles: Tier 2 Motor Vehicle
Emissions Standards and Gasoline Sulfur Control Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 6,698 (Feb.
10, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 80, 85, 86).
3. See, e.g., Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative,
Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122 (Apr. 23, 2004)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541).
4. See, e.g., Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HAACP); Procedures for the
Safe and Sanitary Processing and Importing of Juice, 66 Fed. Reg. 6,138 (Jan. 19, 2001) (to
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 120).
5. Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1981)
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612), amended by Subtitle II of the Contract with America
Advancement Act, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857 (1996).
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achieving the policy goals that the legislature has dictated. One of the
ways the RFA did this was through section 610, which requires federal
agencies to periodically review existing rules and consider reducing the
regulatory burden on small business.
Unfortunately, over the past twenty-five years, federal regulators have
often ignored section 610 and have not conducted periodic reviews of their
rules. Even those agencies which review some of their existing rules under
section 610 rarely act in response to their reviews. Most of these agencies
comply with the letter of the law for only a small percentage of their rules,
and they rarely take action beyond publishing a brief notice in the Federal
Register. Ironically, when regulators conduct periodic reviews under
section 610, they are far more likely to increase the burden of regulation on
small entities than to reduce it. 6
Essentially, since Congress’s order to the federal bureaucracy twentyfive years ago to continuously assess the proper balance between regulatory
goals and the economic burden on small business, the bureaucracy has
responded by ignoring this mandate. Today, Congress is revisiting the
history of agency non-compliance and defiance in the face of its order, and
is considering legislation to ensure that agencies no longer feel secure
regulating the public in perpetuity. 7
This Article first explains the basic requirements of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, and in particular focuses on the periodic review
requirement contained in section 610. It then shares the results of research
on agency implementation rates of section 610 of the Act and discusses the
problems with agency implementation. Finally, it highlights potential
solutions to agency noncompliance, and proposes the adoption of three
amendments to the RFA: the proposed legislation in the House of
Representatives and Senate, which would amend section 610 of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, and two additional amendments, which target
problems that are not addressed in the currently pending legislation.
II. THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT
A.

What is the Regulatory Flexibility Act?
1.

The RFA

During the Carter Administration, public attention turned towards a

6. See infra Part III.B.
7. See infra Part V.
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number of actions by the federal agencies which inflicted widespread harm
on an already fragile economy. 8 Congress responded in 1980 with the
RFA, the express purpose of which was to make agencies:
[E]ndeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable
statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of
the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to
regulation. To achieve this principle, agencies are required to solicit and
consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the rationale for their
actions to assure that such proposals are given serious consideration. 9

The RFA is designed to ensure that agencies consider how their rules
will affect small entities. 10 A federal agency must determine whether a rule
will result in a “significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities,” and if so, must conduct regulatory flexibility analyses to
accompany its proposed and final rules. 11 The agency’s analysis must
include estimates of the impact the rule could have and “a description of
the steps the agency has taken to minimize the significant economic impact
on small entities consistent with the stated objectives of applicable
statutes,” along with the factual, policy, and legal reasons behind the
alternative selected. 12
While the RFA may seem to be a simple procedural hurdle, requiring
only that the agency publish analyses, 13 this analysis is the only statutorily-

8. During the debate over the RFA, Rep. Andrew Ireland discussed abuses of small
entities by federal agencies, including a gas station owner who spent 600 hours filling out
federal reporting forms and a businessman who chose to pay a $500 fine (1979 dollars)
rather than fill out a sixty-three foot-long federal reporting form. 126 CONG. REC. H. 24, 587
(1980). Later research seemed to confirm these Congressional concerns, including one
study by a prominent economist that determined that “about 30 percent of the decline in
productivity growth in manufacturing during the 1970’s may be attributable to [OSHA and
EPA] regulation.” Wayne B. Gray, The Cost of Regulation: OSHA, EPA and the
Productivity Slowdown, 77 AMER. ECON. REV. 998 (1987). It is not surprising that public
attention turned towards regulation, as many of the statutes from which costly federal
regulation stems was passed in the 1970s. See Barry A. Pineles, The Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act: New Options in Regulatory Relief, 5 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 29, 29-30 (1997) (providing an excellent discussion of the statutory
underpinnings of the call for regulatory reform that led to the RFA).
9. 5 U.S.C. § 601 (“Findings and Purposes”).
10. For a masterful overview of the RFA, its goals for small business, and its
achievements and failures, see the article by Keith Holman in this issue of the Fordham
Urban Law Journal. Keith W. Holman, The Regulatory Flexibility Act at 25: Is the Law
Achieving Its Goal?, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. XX (2006).
11. 5 U.S.C. §§ 605(b) (certification), 603 (initial regulatory flexibility analysis), 604
(final regulatory flexibility analysis).
12. 5 U.S.C. §§ 603, 604.
13. See, e.g., U.S. Cellular Corp. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 254 F. 3d 78, 88 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (“Purely procedural, however, RFA section 604 requires nothing more than that
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required, judicially reviewable agency determination on how the agency
will deal with small entities. Prior to the passage of the RFA, agencies
were under no statutory obligation to even consider regulatory alternatives
that could reduce the harm they did to the most vulnerable of regulated
entities. Disproportionate regulatory impacts and agency refusal to
acknowledge the concerns of small entities were the norm prior to the
passage of the RFA. 14 The RFA operates, in conjunction with the APA and
other procedural protections, to confer a procedural right that appears
almost substantive—that is, the right to prevent agencies from harming
small entities arbitrarily.
2.

Section 610 of the RFA

Section 610 of the RFA requires agencies to review a rule within ten
years of the date of its publication for small entity impacts. The RFA
instructs agencies to the following effect:
In reviewing rules to minimize any significant economic impact of the
rule on a substantial number of small entities in a manner consistent with
the stated objectives of applicable statutes, the agency shall consider the
following factors—
(1) the continued need for the rule;
(2) the nature of complaints or comments received concerning the
rule from the public;
(3) the complexity of the rule;
(4) the extent to which the rule overlaps, duplicates or conflicts with
other Federal rules, and, to the extent feasible, with State and local
governmental rules; and
(5) the length of time since the rule has been evaluated or the degree
to which technology, economic conditions, or other factors have
changed in the area affected by the rule. 15

Agencies are also required to publish notice in the Federal Register of
their intent to perform reviews:
Each year, each agency shall publish in the Federal Register a list of the
rules which have a significant economic impact on a substantial number
of small entities, which are to be reviewed pursuant to this section during

the agency file a FRFA [Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis] demonstrating a ‘reasonable,
good-faith effort to carry out [RFA’s] mandate.’” (second bracket in orig.)).
14. S. REP. NO. 96-878, at 3 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2788, 2790; see
Holman, supra note 8, at XX (explaining the need for the Act in defending the rights of
small businesses and discussing its recent successes).
15. 5 U.S.C. § 610(b) (2005).
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the succeeding twelve months. The list shall include a brief description of
each rule and the need for and legal basis of such rule and shall invite
public comment upon the rule. 16

Most agencies began publishing their section 610 lists and notices in the
semi-annual Unified Agenda publications in the mid-1990s. 17
According to section 610 of the RFA, the express purpose of the
periodic review requirement is “to determine whether such rules should be
continued without change, or should be amended or rescinded, consistent
with the stated objectives of applicable statutes, to minimize any significant
economic impact of the rules upon a substantial number of such small
entities.” 18 Congress was explicit in its aims in passing section 610, not
only placing that purpose within the section itself, but declaring that the
purpose of the section 610 review is to “to determine whether the rules and
regulations of the agency are efficiently and equitably achieving the
legislative goals under which they are promulgated.” 19
In 1998, Congress revisited the RFA with a bill that would have
amended section 610, the Regulatory Improvement Act of 1997 (which was
referred to in a Senate Report as the Regulatory Improvement Act of
1998). 20 The bill would have reduced the time period of periodic review
from ten years to five, and would have required agencies to publish legal
and factual determinations upon conclusion of section 610 review,
establishing a judicially reviewable administrative record for an agency’s
decision to leave a rule in place.21 The bill stemmed from a perceived
failure on the part of federal agencies to implement section 610,
congressional frustration with the lack of periodic review, and the intent to

16. 5 U.S.C. § 610(c).
17. There was, however, no one place the public could go to see all the rules for which
agencies had published notice of review under section 610. Then, in the fall of 1997, the
Unified Agenda started publishing an index with all the section 610 notices for that issue.
62 Fed. Reg. 58,557 (Oct. 29, 1997). Since then, each publication has included an
Appendix A, “Index to Entries that Agencies Have Designated for Section 610 Review.”
18. 5 U.S.C. § 610(a) (2005).
19. S. REP. NO. 96-878, at 15 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2788, 2802. In
2005, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce underlined this purpose by sending a
letter to the heads of ten federal agencies demanding proof of compliance with what it
described as “the only crosscutting statutory requirement through which federal agencies
reexamine certain rules after they have been issued.” Letter from Joe Barton, Chairman,
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, to Heads of Ten Federal Agencies (Apr. 4,
2005), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Letters/04052005_1501.htm.
20. Regulatory Improvement Act of 1997, S. 981, 105th Cong. § 3 (1998).
21. Id. The relevant subsection heading under section 632 is: Advisory committee on
regulations. Id; see also Regulatory Improvement Act of 1998, S. REP. NO. 105-188, at 5658 (1998).
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confer “the benefits intended by Congress in 1980.” 22 This bill, however,
was ultimately not passed. 23
Section 610 reflects Congress’s explicit decision to act, even though
then-President Carter had acted with his Executive authority to require the
same periodic review from agencies. 24 Executive Order 12,044, signed by
President Carter, required agencies to consider both the costs of new
regulations to small business (as the RFA later would), and to “periodically
review their existing regulations,” considering:
(a)
the
continued
need
for
the
regulation;
(b) the type and number of complaints or suggestions received;
(c) the burdens imposed on those directly or indirectly affected by the
regulations;
(d)
the
need
to
simplify
or
clarify
language;
(e) the need to eliminate overlapping and duplicative regulations; and
(f) the length of time since the regulation has been evaluated or the degree
to which technology, economic conditions or other factors have changed
in the area affected by the regulation. 25

This Executive Order was in place and functioning for a full two years
before Congress considered the RFA. The legislators who voted for the
RFA were fully aware of Executive Order 12,044, addressing it in a Senate
Report which stated that the order was insufficient to protect the rights of
small entities because it was “not subject to judicial review and the order is
not permanent law but may be rescinded by the President at any time,” and
because “[a]dherence to the order by the independent regulatory
agencies . . . is completely voluntary.” 26
Despite sitting under a President who shared the goals of the RFA and
ordered his agencies to perform the RFA’s periodic review, Congress
nonetheless decided that the periodic review provision was so important
that it should be required by statute, with a provision for judicial review,
and that it should be applicable to every federal regulatory agency.
As discussed below, President George W. Bush has made efforts to
review some federal rules. 27 It is unclear whether the current Congress will
decide to defer to the Executive branch’s existing efforts to retain a free
hand while reviewing regulations, or to act firmly in amending section 610

22. S. REP. NO. 105-188, at 57 (1998).
23. Library of Congress, Thomas, List of All Congressional Actions Regarding S. 981,
http://thomas.loc.gov/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2006).
24. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (Mar. 24, 1978).
25. Id. at 12,663.
26. S. REP. NO. 96-878, at 8 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2788, 2795.
27. See infra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
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to create a functional and enforceable periodic review requirement. What
is clear is that the reformers of the 96th Congress 28 ultimately chose not to
make reasonable regulation contingent on the continuing good will of the
nation’s Chief Executive.
B.

The Importance of Periodic Review

Periodic review of rules is not merely an academic construct or a dry,
procedural hurdle. The review of existing regulations is significant because
of the real world consequences of failure to do so, like the “ratchet
effect.” 29 Because of such consequences, regulatory reviews have been
supported for various reasons for more than twenty-five years within the
executive branch, with results indicating that such reviews are not only
feasible, but also advisable from a regulatory burden-reduction standpoint.
1.

The Ratchet Effect

The main problem addressed by periodic review of existing agency
regulation is the “ratchet effect.” Like a ratchet, regulation has the
tendency to move in one direction only—that is, becoming more
restrictive. 30 In some areas of regulation, such as health, safety, and
environmental rules, when technological advances indicate that benefits are
available, the government will regulate. In addition, some statutes, such as

28. Interestingly, the refusal to defer to the executive branch did not result from party
politics, and the RFA was not approved by Congress on strict party lines. During the 96th
Congress, the House of Representatives, which passed the bill on a voice vote, was
comprised of 277 Democrats and 158 Republicans, and was presided over by Speaker of the
House Thomas “Tip” O’Neil (D-Mass.).
Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of
Representatives,
Congressional
History,
http://clerk.house.gov/histHigh/Congressional_History/index.html (last visited Apr. 13,
2006).Similarly, the Senate was divided 58-41-1 with a Democratic majority. U.S. Senate,
Party
Division
in
the
Senate,
1789-Present,
http://senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Apr.
13, 2006). Of course, President Carter, who signed the RFA on September 19, 1980, was
also a Democrat, and fully intended to remain in the White House for a second term to live
with the consequences of the RFA. The members of the 96th Congress truly earned the title
of “reformers,” as they voted to impose checks on the Executive’s power at a time when
their party held the White House, thus reducing their own party’s political power.
29. See infra Part II.B.1.
30. Professional academics and advocates are quick to point out a handful of specific
examples of politically-motivated actions which reduced regulatory burdens or minimized a
proposed increase in those burdens. It is instructive, however, to consider that the Code of
Federal Regulations currently amounts to more than 100,000 pages of federal rules. Both
the author and the knowledgeable reader would likely find themselves hard-pressed to
identify more than a few individual sections per year for which sufficient political support
existed to actually reduce regulatory burdens below existing levels.
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the Safe Drinking Water Act, do not allow agencies to reduce regulatory
requirements, 31 causing the regulatory agency to set the previous regulation
as the “baseline,” below which it does not consider the impact of its
actions. Even without statutory mandates, many agencies set the existing
burdens they impose on the public as the baseline for regulation whenever
they consider additional requirements. Thus, while these new requirements
may have only minor incremental effects, the regulation as a whole
imposes major economic burdens on the regulated community. Finally,
even businesses that expend capital on one-time improvements are
sometimes reluctant to see burden reductions, as these expenditures can
operate as barriers to entry and reduce competition for existing market
players. This is the ratchet effect—the natural tendency of agency officials
charged with achieving public benefits to focus on pursuing those benefits
and not on reducing the burdens of their regulation to the public.
The problem of the ratchet effect is not an academic or hypothetical
construct; it occurs on a regular basis in large, expensive rulemakings by
federal agencies. One prominent example of the ratchet effect in action
was the recent rulemaking by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
limiting diesel particulate matter emissions from nonroad diesel engines
(e.g., bulldozers, generators, and other construction equipment). 32 In that
rulemaking, EPA amended an original rule published in 1994 that limited
emissions from nonroad diesel engines.33 This fourth “tier,” or round, of
emissions reductions (“the tier IV amendments”) was set to lower
emissions from the levels set by previous emissions reduction rules and
would require large capital and equipment expenditures by engine and
equipment manufacturers. 34 The rule did not consider the overall costs
EPA had imposed on regulated entities in all four tiers of regulation, and it
did not balance those costs against the actions it had previously taken.35

31. Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, § 2(a), 88 Stat. 1662 (1974) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(9)).
32. Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Nonroad Diesel Engines and Fuel, 69
Fed. Reg. 38,958, 38,960 (June 29, 2004) (amending Control of Air Pollution;
Determination of Significance for Nonroad Sources and Emission Standards for New
Nonroad Compression-Ignition Engines At or Above 37 Kilowatts, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,306
(June 17, 1994)).
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Air Nonroad Diesel-Tier 4
Final Rule, http://www.epa.gov/nonroad-diesel/2004fr.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
35. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REVISED INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR EPA
RULEWRITERS: REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT AS AMENDED BY THE SMALL BUSINESS
REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT FAIRNESS ACT
82-83
(1999),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/sbrefa/documents/iguid99.pdf [hereinafter EPA, REVISED INTERIM
GUIDANCE] (guidance document for EPA rule writers stating that the determinative factor
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Instead, the rule measured the incremental costs of the Tier IV
amendments, and considered alternatives to the amendment in process.36
The EPA has not published a notice of periodic review for its 1994 rule, as
required by the RFA and the EPA’s own procedures. 37 Further, the
amendments to the original emissions restrictions have not considered
alternatives by balancing costs and benefits for reducing the existing
burdens imposed by the 1994 rule. 38 The amendment of the existing rule
did not trigger a public review of the previous rule’s requirements and
justification. The short conclusion to be drawn is that EPA considers its
regulation of the public as a one-way street. 39
2.

Historical Recognition by the President of the Importance of Periodic
Review of Rules

For more than twenty-five years, the periodic review of existing rules
has been supported by both Republican and Democratic Administrations.
As discussed below, every president since President Carter has imposed
either a temporary moratorium on regulation or a general review of existing
regulation to identify individual candidates for reform, and some have
for whether section 610 review is required for a rule that was subsequently amended is
whether amendment eliminated the rule’s impacts).
36. Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Nonroad Diesel Engines and Fuel, 69
Fed. Reg. at 39,145-49; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL REGULATORY ANALYSIS:
CONTROL OF EMISSIONS FROM NONROAD DIESEL ENGINES ch.6 (2004), available at
http://www.epa.gov/nonroad-diesel/2004fr/420r04007.pdf [hereinafter EPA, CONTROL OF
EMISSIONS].
37. Though the rule was superceded by later additional regulation, EPA policy is not to
review a rule unless subsequent rulemaking eliminates the first rule’s impacts. See EPA,
REVISED INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 35, at 82-83. The problem of when an agency must
review rules that are subsequently amended is discussed later in this paper.
38. Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Nonroad Diesel Engines and Fuel, 69
Fed. Reg. at 39,159-62; Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Nonroad Diesel
Engines, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,968, at 56,977-983, 56,992-993 (Oct. 23, 1998).
39. The EPA cannot claim that it had no choice under the Clean Air Act (CAA) but to
impose the regulatory burdens it did. While it is true that section 213 of the CAA instructs
the Administrator of EPA to implement standards for nonroad mobile nitrogen oxide
emissions that “achieve the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable,” the CAA also
provides in the same sentence that the Administrator shall only do so, “giving appropriate
consideration to the cost of applying such technology within the period of time available to
manufacturers and to noise, energy, and safety factors.” See 42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(3) (2000).
Further, the “shall” is removed from the similar instructions to the Administrator pertaining
to regulation of particulate matter; thus, the EPA “may” regulate emissions of particulate
matter (the main culprit in the 2004 rulemaking), but only after considering “costs, noise,
safety, and energy factors.” 42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(4). Thus, although EPA has a clear
congressional mandate to regulate the emissions that nonroad diesel rules were designed to
reduce, it has an equally clear order to adequately balance the costs of said regulation
against the emissions reduction benefits sought.
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instituted both approaches. Every administration since Reagan’s has
committed the executive branch to a systematic review of all new rules for
costs and benefits, and has implemented special procedures for the review
of some existing rules.
a.

Temporary Regulatory Moratoriums and General Reviews

Since the Carter Administration, three of five presidents have imposed
regulatory moratoriums on federal agencies, and every administration has
engaged in general reviews of existing regulations to identify candidates
that are ripe for reform. As discussed above, in 1978, President Carter
signed Executive Order 12,044, which for the first time committed federal
agencies to periodically reviewing their existing regulations. 40 This
marked the first executive action aimed at reviewing rules on systematic
bases after their promulgation, with the goal of reducing unnecessary
regulatory burdens.
On assuming office in 1981, one of President Reagan’s first actions was
to delay the effective date of the previous administration’s last-minute
regulatory actions. His Executive Order 12,291 and memorandum to the
heads of federal agencies ordered agencies to delay the effective dates of
the proposed rules for sixty days. 41 As discussed below, this order also
required for the first time the review of some regulations by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) prior to their publication. 42
Then, in 1992, President George H.W. Bush imposed a moratorium on
all regulatory actions by his own administration, ordering all regulatory
actions to be withheld from publication as final rules for ninety days.43
During this time, the President ordered agencies to identify rules that
imposed substantial costs on the economy, and weigh those costs against
the rules’ benefits, to ensure that the “expected benefits to society of any
regulation should clearly outweigh the expected costs it imposes on
society.” 44 President Bush then extended this ninety-day moratorium
another 120-days. 45 From January 28 through October 28, 1992, federal
40. Exec. Order No. 12,044, at § 4, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,663 (Mar. 23, 1978).
41. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981); Memorandum for the
Heads of Agencies, Postponment of Pending Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 11,227 (Jan. 29,
1981).
42. See infra text accompanying note 67; Exec. Order No. 12,291, at § 3, 46 Fed. Reg.
13,194, 13,195 (Feb. 17, 1981).
43. Memorandum on Reducing the Burden of Government Regulation, 1 PUB. PAPERS
166 (Jan. 28, 1992).
44. Id. at 167.
45. Memorandum on Implementing Regulatory Reforms, 1 PUB. PAPERS 665 (Apr. 29,
1992).
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agencies operated under a moratorium on new regulatory actions and were
theoretically reviewing some of their existing rules.46
The results of this review indicate the importance of periodic review of
existing regulations. In response to the President’s memorandum, agencies
published nineteen final rules which reduced regulatory burdens, either by
withdrawing previous publications or amending sections of the Code of
Federal Regulations (C.F.R.). 47 This result stands in stark contrast to the
results of the periodic review requirement of the RFA, which achieved a
smaller number of final rules reducing regulatory burdens over the course
of almost eight years. 48
In 1993, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12,866, which
required agencies to:
submit to OIRA a program . . . under which the agency will periodically
review its existing regulations to determine whether any such regulations
should be modified or eliminated so as to make the agency’s regulatory
program more effective in achieving the regulatory objective, less
burdensome, or in greater alignment with the President’s priorities and the
principles set forth in this Executive order. 49

The General Accounting Office (GAO) completed a review of the
agency response to the call for periodic review, and determined that four
agencies had reviewed a total of 422 rules in the C.F.R. Of these,
approximately forty percent constituted actions which would reduce
regulatory burdens to the regulated public. 50 At the same time, agencies
reported that they had eliminated many duplicative or unnecessary C.F.R.
sections, totaling more than 13,000 pages.51
In 2001, President George W. Bush imposed a moratorium on federal

46. Id.
47. To determine the outcome of President Bush’s general review order, the author
searched Federal Register notice publications for citations to “Reducing Burden of
Government Regulation” using Westlaw. The results are likely to be conservative in their
attribution of any particular action to the President’s memorandum, as the rule was not
counted unless it specifically referenced the memorandum.
48. See infra Part III.B.
49. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,740 (Sept. 30, 1993).
50. U.S GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REGULATORY REFORM: AGENCIES’ EFFORTS TO
ELIMINATE AND REVISE RULES YIELD MIXED RESULTS 2 (1997), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98003.pdf [herinafter GAO, AGENCIES’ EFFORTS TO
ELIMINATE].
51. Id. at 7. However, this amount did not include pages that were added to the C.F.R.
during the same time-period. As a result, when GAO reviewed four agencies’ page
eliminations, it found that their net page elimination was approximately seventeen percent
of the gross elimination they had reported. Id.
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regulation that was very similar to President Reagan’s. 52 The Bush
Administration forbade the publication of pending final rules until they had
been reviewed by an Administration appointee, and postponed the effective
date of regulations whose effective date was still pending for sixty days.53
This moratorium postponed the effective date of some Clinton
Administration “midnight regulations,” including potentially costly rules
like the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) information
privacy rules under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996. 54 Most of these regulatory requirements were eventually allowed
to become final. 55
President George W. Bush’s actions in soliciting and acting on public
nominations for regulatory reform have demonstrated the feasibility and
advisability of medium-scale periodic reviews. In 1997, before President
Bush took office, OMB began submitting reports to Congress on the costs
and benefits of federal regulation, including a notice that OMB was seeking
nominations from the regulated public on rules which should be
reformed. 56 Beginning in 2001, however, OMB began earnestly soliciting
agency input on the suitability of these recommendations for reform, and
tracking agency changes to the rules. In 2001 and 2002, OIRA solicited
general proposals for regulatory reform. 57 In 2004, OIRA focused on
reform proposals designed to provide regulatory relief to the manufacturing

52. Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies; Regulatory Review Plan, 66 Fed. Reg. 7,702 (Jan. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/print/20010123-4.html.
53. Id.
54. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462, 82,760-61 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (Health and Human
Services rule estimated to cost more than $17.5 billion, effective as of February 26, 2001).
55. See, e.g., Correction of Effective and Compliance Dates, Standards for Privacy of
Individually Identifiable Health Information, 66 Fed. Reg. 12,434 (Feb. 26, 2001) (codified
at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (delaying the effective date of the Health and Human Services
rule); Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg.
53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (Health and Human Services).
56. See, e.g., Notice and Request for Comments, Draft Report to Congress on the Costs
and Benefits of Federal Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 39,352 (July 22, 1997) (Office of
Management and Budget); Notice and Request for Comments, Draft Report to Congress on
the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, 63 Fed. Reg. 44,034 (Aug. 17, 1998) (Office
of Management and Budget). These reports were required by appropriations bills,
beginning in 1997. Treasury, Postal Services and General Government Appropriations Act,
at § 645, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-366 (1996).
57. Notice and Request for Comments, Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and
Benefits of Federal Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 22,041, 22,054 (May 2, 2001) (Office of
Management and Budget); Notice and Request for Comments, Draft Report to Congress on
the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,014, 15,033 (Mar. 28, 2002)
(Office of Management and Budget).
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sector. 58
In response to the 2001 public notice, OMB received seventy-one
nominations, and designated twenty-three of them a “high priority.” 59
Many nominations simply urged agencies to adopt policies or guidance that
would reduce uncertainty, expressed disapproval of agency actions without
recommending a course of action, or supported a general withdrawal of a
rulemaking that had not yet been completed. 60 In response to these twentythree “high priority” proposals, agencies acted on many and provided
responses to all of them. 61
In 2002, OMB received recommendations for the reform of 316 separate
rules and guidance documents. 62 The overwhelming response to the 2002
call for nominations for reform forced OMB to change its process for
identifying those recommendations which should be acted upon. In 2002,
OMB forwarded the list of recommendations to the federal agencies
themselves and to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy at the Small Business
Administration (SBA), with instructions to identify potential candidates for
action based on the principles of “efficiency, fairness, and practicality.”63
Of the more than 300 recommendations, OMB, the Chief Counsel for
Advocacy, and the federal agencies themselves identified thirty-four
existing rules to be in need of reform. 64
OMB’s call for recommendations for reform generally mentioned small
business, but was not tailored to reducing small entity burdens, as required
by section 610 of the RFA. 65 Many of the reforms considered did little

58. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY REFORM OF THE U.S. MANUFACTURING
SECTOR
(2005),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/regpolreports_congress.html.
59. See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, STIMULATING SMARTER REGULATION: 2002
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND
UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 104-06 (2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2002_report_to_congress.pdf [hereinafter OMB,
STIMULATING SMARTER REGULATION] (status of the twenty-three High-Priority Rules OIRA
Suggested for Reform in 2001).
60. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, MAKING SENSE OF REGULATION: 2001 REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON
STATE,
LOCAL,
AND
TRIBAL
ENTITIES
65-135
(2001),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/costbenefitreport.pdf.
61. OMB, STIMULATING SMARTER REGULATION, supra note 59, at 70.
62. Id. at 4.
63. John D. Graham, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Memorandum for the President’s
Management Council: Agency Response to Public Regulatory Reform Nominations (Dec.
20
2002),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/pmc_agency_response_regreform.html.
64. OMB, STIMULATING SMARTER REGULATION, supra note 59, at 25-28.
65. Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, 66 Fed.
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more than eliminate duplicative requirements or “clarify” agency policy
which impose more regulatory burdens on firms. 66 The OMB nomination
process should not be assumed to be a proper substitute for periodic
reviews under the RFA. That said, the OMB nomination process
demonstrated the feasibility of agency review of existing regulations and
the ability of OMB to work closely with the agencies to identify and
complete priority reviews of many of the existing rules that affect small
entities.
b.

Efforts to Review Rules As They Are Promulgated

Currently, most major rules are reviewed outside federal agencies, prior
to their publication, for their costs and benefits to society. Agencies have
proven themselves capable of dealing with the requirement of estimating
the costs and benefits of their rules and adopting regulatory approaches
which maximize benefits and minimize costs, while meeting the regulatory
duties imposed on them by Congress.
As mentioned above, President Reagan’s Executive Order 12,291
required agencies for the first time to submit rules to OMB for review of
costs and benefits before publication. 67 President Reagan also ordered
agencies to submit to OMB their annual plans for regulation, to ensure that
these plans conformed to his Administration’s policies and practices, and to
assist OMB in identifying opportunities for reducing regulatory burdens. 68
In 1993, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12,866, which, in
addition to mandating pre-publication review of regulations similar to
Executive Order 12,291, ordered federal agencies to conduct periodic
reviews of their existing regulations to identify rules which had become
obsolete or whose regulatory objectives could be achieved in a less
burdensome fashion. 69 Less than two years later, President Clinton
followed up on this Executive Order with a memorandum that ordered

Reg. at 22,054.
66. Of seventy-one nominations received in response to the 2001 solicitation, only
twenty-three were classified as high-priority actions. OMB, STIMULATING SMARTER
REGULATION, supra note 59, at 104-06. Of the more than 300 nominations for reform
submitted in response to the 2002 notice, only thirty-four were identified as deserving of
action. Id. at 25-28 tbl.9.
67. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 at § 3. Although it is true that
President Carter’s Executive Order 12,044 was the first measure to explicitly require agency
heads to consider costs and select the least burdensome of regulatory alternatives, it did not
provide for review of regulations by non-agency personnel prior to publication of final rules.
Exec. Order. No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. at 12661-662.
68. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (Jan. 4, 1985).
69. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sep. 30, 1993).
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federal agencies to complete a review of existing regulation in four steps.70
The President required agencies to identify obsolete, overly burdensome, or
otherwise unnecessary rules, and to deliver a list of such regulations to
OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). 71 Agencies
were also ordered to change their enforcement incentives to cease
rewarding employees for “red tape,” to consult and meet with regulated
industries and entities, and to identify a list of rulemakings to be conducted
through negotiated rulemaking. 72 Executive Order 12,866 remains in
effect, and agencies continue to submit regulations to OIRA prior to
publication for review of costs and benefits.
c.

Ex Post Validation of Cost Estimates

One current Bush Administration priority is to implement a policy of ex
post economic impact review. 73 Such reviews would validate ex ante
agency cost estimates provided to OMB during Executive Order 12,866
cost-benefit review. In its draft 2005 report to Congress on regulatory costs
and benefits, OMB outlined the concept of ex post validation studies in
depth and solicited comments from the public on the value of such studies
and their proper scope. 74 OMB also presented a review of the literature
regarding existing ex post validation studies, indicating that a problem
exists with agency underestimation of economic impacts and
overestimation of regulatory benefit.75
III. THE HISTORICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 610 OF THE RFA
As discussed above, Congress passed section 610 of the RFA for the
express purpose of forcing agencies to periodically reexamine their
regulation of small business, resulting in cost savings. 76 The periodic
review requirement, however, appears to have failed to result in reduced

70. Memorandum on Regulatory Reform, 1 PUB. PAPERS 304, 304-06 (Mar. 4, 1995) ,
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubpapers/search.html (search by title and date).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS: 2005
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND
UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 41-53 (2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2005_cb/final_2005_cb_report.pdf (providing an
interesting discussion of the concept).
74. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2005 DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND
BENEFITS
OF
FEDERAL
REGULATIONS
35-44
(2005),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2005_cb/draft_2005_cb_report.pdf.
75. Id. at 40-44.
76. See supra notes 18-19, and accompanying text.
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regulatory burdens on small businesses. The record establishes that
agencies do not complete section 610 reviews for rules that impose
significant economic impacts on a substantial number of small entities.77
This failure appears to be due to ambiguities found within the RFA itself
that allow agencies to defer the consideration of how their actions impact
small entities.78 Finally, even when ambiguities are resolved in the favor
of small entities and the agency performs the small entity review required
by section 610, this review does not usually result in the reduction of
regulatory burdens on small entities. 79
To determine agency compliance with section 610, the author: (1)
reviewed existing literature on agency compliance with section 610, (2)
analyzed all final rules promulgated in a year by selected agencies and
determined the section 610 review rates for those rules, and (3) reviewed
the regulatory outcomes for every section 610 review notice published in
the Federal Register for a sample period of seven years. This research first
included a review of whether agencies were actually posting notice of
section 610 reviews, as the RFA requires. Then, for those rules which were
subject to section 610 reviews, a determination was made as to whether the
section 610 reviews actually resulted in regulatory actions that reduced
regulatory burdens to small business, based on the written records.
The results of the review indicate that the review of final rules under
section 610 within ten years is not commonplace, and that section 610
reviews rarely result in the reduction of regulatory burdens to small
business. The author’s regulatory survey and review identified a number of
specific reasons for these problems with agency compliance, as well as
some shortcomings of section 610 itself with regard to its goal of small
business burden reduction.
A.

Agencies Do Not Appear to Have Reviewed All Rules the RFA
Requires

1.

Existing Studies Indicate That Agencies Have Not Reviewed All the
Rules as Required

Existing research shows that there is a disparity between the numbers of
final agency actions referenced in each Unified Agenda and the number of
section 610 review notices by comparing Unified Agenda entries for
agencies’ final rules each year with the number of section 610 reviews the
77. See infra Part III.A.
78. See infra Part IV.A.
79. See infra Part III.B.
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agencies completed in the same period. 80 In 2005, the Congressional
Research Service (CRS) found that the 2004 Spring and Summer Unified
Agendas each had an average of about 400 entries with impacts on small
entities, but only about thirty section 610 notices. 81 In another study, GAO
reviewed entries from the fall of 1988 through the fall of 1997, finding that
six agencies each had an average of more than thirty entries every year
which could have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities, and that none of these agencies had section 610 review
entries in the 1998 Federal Register for the rules they had reported in their
regulatory plans over the previous ten years. 82 In fact, for those half-dozen
agencies, GAO identified 345 entries in the Fall 1997 edition of the Unified
Agenda that would have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. 83
2.

Analysis of Public Filings of Selected Agencies Indicates That
Agencies Have Not Reviewed All Required Rules

As discussed above, the existing studies generally indicate that the
number of final rules each year is strikingly greater than the number of
section 610 reviews, 84 but no study to date has actually reviewed whether
agencies actually completed section 610 reviews when required to do so.
The reason appears to be that any such study involves an almost inordinate
amount of time to: (1) identify actual final rules published in a year, (2)
review the regulatory provisions of each individual rule, and (3)
“Shepardize” each regulatory provision affecting small entities for at least
ten years. Such an approach, however, is necessary. Existing research is
helpful and illustrative of the current trend, but agencies can still assert that
they have been consistently performing section 610 reviews, and that the
existing research is flawed because: (1) the studies examine the number of
rulemakings agencies enter into Unified Agenda indexes each year, as
opposed to the number actually completed; 85 (2) many rules actually

80. For example, an agency might have 400 entries in the Spring and Summer Unified
Agendas listed as final rules, but no entries in those same Unified Agendas for section 610
reviews.
81. CURTIS COPELAND, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, REEXAMINING RULES:
SECTION 610 OF THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT 8 (2005).
82. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT: AGENCIES’
INTERPRETATIONS OF REVIEW REQUIREMENTS VARY 12-14 (1999) [hereinafter GAO,
AGENCIES’ INTERPRETATIONS], available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99055.pdf.
83. See id.
84. See supra Part III.A.1.
85. For example, the 2005 CRS study found that Department of Commerce had thirtythree entries in the June 2004 Unified Agenda that it had identified as likely to have a
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completed are no longer still in effect after ten years (and therefore are no
longer subject to section 610); and (3) many rules which are still in effect
have been so markedly revised that section 610 review would more
appropriately be done for the rulemakings amending the original rule; in
effect, “resetting the clock.”
To determine the validity of the agencies’ rationale, this author
researched agency practice by reading every final rule promulgated in 1993
by select agencies and investigated whether each rule was determined to
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities, thereby triggering the periodic review requirement of section
610. 86 These agencies were selected based on existing research that
identified them as having the largest numbers of Unified Agenda entries for
final actions or actions which were likely to impact small entities. 87 The
year 1993 was chosen because any reasonable “grace period” would have
expired by Summer 2005. To obtain a representative sample, the author
reviewed every final rule promulgated in 1993 by Departments of
Commerce, Labor, Health and Human Services, as well as the Small
Business Administration. The results for 1993 and 1994 are illustrated
below in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.

significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. COPELAND, supra
note 81, at 8. Review of Federal Register notices published by the Department of
Commerce in 1993 shows that the agency published only fourteen final rules through the
entire year that were characterized as having a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. See supra Part III.A.2 tbl.1. Though this sample is small, and any
discrepancy might be due to statutory changes and the agency’s response to repeated RFA
litigation between 1993 and 2005, the discrepancy is still present.
86. Section 610 does not state whether this impact is measured at the time of publication
or at the time of periodic review. See 5 U.S.C. § 610. This discussion assumes that those
rules which would impact small business at the time of publication would continue to do so
at the time of periodic review, while rules which did not have small business impacts at the
time of publication for the most part have not developed new small business impacts.
87. See, e.g., CONSAD RESEARCH CORP., AN EVALUATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE
REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT BY FEDERAL AGENCIES 24 (2001), available at
http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs215tot.pdf (analyzing the number of final rules issued
by agencies from 1995 through 1999 and concluding that three agencies (SEC, HHS, and
Commerce) accounted for half of all final rules and that HHS, Commerce, and EPA
accounted for half of all final rules that affected small entities—EPA was excluded from this
analysis due to time constraints).
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Table 1. Section 610 Review Rates for All Final Rules Published by
Selected Agencies (1993)
FINAL RULES AGENCY IDENTIFIED AS
AGENCY

FINAL
RULES

Commerce

82

14 (17.1%)

FINAL RULES FOR
WHICH THE AGENCY
PUBLISHED NOTICE OF §
610 REVIEW (TO DATE)
0

Labor
HHS 88

13
197

0 (0%)
22 (11.1%)

0
0

SBA

17

1 (5.8%)

0

Total

309

37 (11.9%)

0

HAVING SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC
IMPACT ON SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER
OF SMALL ENTITIES

As Table 1 illustrates, agencies in the sample ranged from zero to
seventeen percent of their final rules being labeled as likely to have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
None of the 37 rules labeled as significant under the RFA promulgated
during the sample period were analyzed by the agencies under section
610. 89 Some of the possible reasons for this outcome are discussed in Part
IV.
B.

Section 610 Has Not Resulted in a Significant Reduction of
Regulatory Burdens to Small Entities

Analysis of agency actions in connection with section 610 leads to the
conclusion that agencies are not reducing burdens to small entities in
response to section 610 reviews. For the period reviewed, 1997-2005, the
author identified notices for 154 separate section 610 reviews, then
researched each action to determine whether the agency ultimately acted on
88. HHS published twenty-one final rules in the Federal Register on the same day:
January 6, 1993. These notices could properly be considered as one rulemaking, as they
were accompanied by a single FRFA and addressed the same general regulatory framework
(food labeling). However, since they were promulgated separately by the agency and some
of their provisions separated into separate C.F.R. sections, they were reviewed individually
for section 610 reviews and continuing effect.
89. Clearly, this sample is small, but it does illustrate part of the problem, and invites
more intensive research into the question. As discussed below, other agencies have
published notices of section 610 review for other years. See infra Part III.B. For example,
between the fall of 1997 and the summer of 2005, this author identified 154 section 610
reviews being referenced in the Unified Agenda.
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the section 610 review by issuing a final rule. 90 Agencies published fifteen
final rules in response to section 610 reviews that appeared to reduce small
entity burdens. Researching the same period, the author found that
agencies published final rules in twenty-six rulemakings identified as part
of a section 610 review that appeared to increase regulatory burdens on
small entities.91 Much more commonly, agencies did not publish final
rules in response to section 610 review. Ninty-seven actions ultimately did
not result in a final rule. 92 Thus, it appears that the possible outcomes from
a section 610 review conducted during the 1997-2005 sample period were
(in order of likelihood): (1) no action on the part of the agency, (2) a
rulemaking which imposed greater regulatory burdens on small entities,
and (3) a rulemaking which objectively reduced small entity burdens.

90. This methodology closely matched that employed by GAO in 1997, when it
reviewed regulatory actions by the Clinton Administration to determine if these actions
reflected regulatory burden reductions. GAO reviewed Unified Agenda descriptions of 422
regulatory actions by four agencies to determine the rule’s effect, proposed and final
versions of the rules from the Federal Register, and, if necessary, interviewed agency
officials. GAO, AGENCIES’ EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE, supra note 50, at 5-6. In preparing this
Article, the author skipped the preliminary step of reviewing Unified Agenda entries due to
the likelihood of oversimplification by those short discussions and went straight to
reviewing proposed and final rules. The author then followed up with interviews of affected
small entity representatives and agency officials for those rules whose effects were not selfevident.
91. Not surprisingly, there were a few outliers within the sample. Ten final rules
appeared to either have no effect on small business due to their being purely technical
revisions or because they regulated industries which had no small businesses. In addition,
although it was not within the author’s expertise to determine whether some rules
represented burden reductions or increases, questions were resolved in the favor of agencies,
and three rules were included in the “deregulatory” category that were questionable, and two
rules were excluded from the “regulatory” category because burden increases were not
clear. Further, three rules appeared to both impose and reduce regulatory burdens to small
business and were excluded from the analysis entirely in the interest of simplicity. Oddly,
four rulemakings appeared to be mistakenly identified by the agency in Unified Agenda
notices as part of section 610 reviews when they actually were not. In the case of one of
these rules, the agency both claimed that the rulemaking was part of a section 610 review
and that the rule was exempt from the RFA—hence the agency included no consideration of
small business impacts.
92. Some agencies published notices in the Federal Register for some reviews stating
that they had reviewed the rule under section 610 and had determined that no change was
warranted.
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TABLE 2. RESULTS OF SECTION 610 REVIEWS: 1997-2005
Reduce
Small
Entity
Burdens

Increase
Small
Entity
Burdens

No Effect on
Small
Entities

Impacts
Uncertain

No
Final
Agency
Action

Listed
By
Error As §
610 Review

15

26

10

2

97

4

10.3%

16.9%

6.5%

1.3%

63%

2.6%

TOTAL

154
100.6%
93

The reasons for this outcome are discussed below in Part IV.
IV. THE REASONS FOR LOW REVIEW RATES AND THE FAILURE OF
SECTION 610 TO ACHIEVE REDUCTION IN REGULATORY BURDENS TO
SMALL ENTITIES
There are two sets of problems inherent in the current section 610 which
lead to the outcome of low review rates, and to the Act’s general failure to
encourage agencies to review existing rules in order to reduce regulatory
burdens to small entities.
A.

The Causes for Historically Low Review Rates

Under the current RFA, agencies appear to have three main reasons for
not completing section 610 reviews for the rules identified by my research.
Low review rates may stem from agencies: (1) “restarting the clock” by
amending regulations, (2) making determinations that rules are not actually
affecting small entities, and (3) in some cases, simply neglecting to fulfill
their statutory duties.
1.

Agencies Often “Restart the Clock” for Rules Through Amendment

One ambiguity within section 610 that appears to lead to low review
rates is the apparent ability of an agency to “restart the clock” for the ten
year deadline for periodic review found in the RFA. 94 Section 610
provides for “the review of such rules adopted after the effective date of
this chapter within ten years of the publication of such rules as the final
rule.” 95 Section 610 does not discuss whether “rules” refers to only the
93. Percentages add up to 100.6 percent because they were rounded to the nearest tenth.
94. 5 U.S.C § 610(a) (2000).
95. Id.
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changes to the C.F.R. published in the “final rule,” the entire C.F.R. section
in which those changes are found, or any subsequent amendments. Further,
any changes to the amendment may involve RFA determinations of their
own, which could trigger incremental effects analysis that fails to capture
the true cost of the regulatory provision, but resets the ten-year review
cycle. Hence, many agencies take the view that publication of any
subsequent amendment to the C.F.R. section altered by the final rule in
question “restarts the clock,” allowing the agency another ten years for
RFA review from the date of amendment. 96 In fact, some agencies have
historically taken the view that any review of a C.F.R. section, even
without amending the first final rule or analyzing the C.F.R. section for the
elements required by section 610, restarts the clock for purposes of periodic
review. 97
This problem arises commonly in actions that are temporally limited in
their effects, but which are promulgated under statutory or regulatory
frameworks that recur or require re-promulgation from time to time. Some
examples would include Department of Commerce fisheries quotas and
other rules that are adjusted from fishing season to fishing season. 98 These
rules are often limited by their fishery regulatory regimes to three to five
years of applicability, at the end of which the agency can set more or less
burdensome quotas. 99 The agency is usually all but required, however, by

96. See, e.g., NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERVS., NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE
INSTRUCTION 01-111-03: PROCEDURES FOR PERIODIC REVIEW OF SIGNIFICANT RULES UNDER
SECTION 610 OF THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT § II (2005) (“Rules Subject to Review”)
(exempting from section 610 review “multi-year specifications requiring proposed and final
rulemaking,” which are usually amended and retained for additional years, with existing
regulatory burdens considered the baseline for regulation), available at
http://reefshark.nmfs.noaa.gov/f/pds/publicsite/documents/procedures/01-111-03.pdf. But
see, EPA, REVISED INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 33, at 82-83.
97. For instance, in a 1999 report, GAO stated, “SBA’s [Deputy Chief Counsel for
Advocacy] told us that SBA had reviewed and revised all of its rules in the mid-1990s as
part of the Clinton Administration’s regulatory reform initiative, and she said that effort met
the spirit and intent of the section 610 review requirement. . . . Because any rules issued
after the initiative would have been less than 10 years old in 1998, the [Deputy Chief
Counsel] said SBA had no rules with a [significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities] that required section 610 review.”
GAO, AGENCIES’
INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 82, at 14-15.
98. See Magnuson-Stevens Act, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (Apr. 13, 1976)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (2000)).
99. See, e.g., Proposed Rule and Request for Comments, Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act Provisions; Fisheries of the Northeastern United States;
Atlantic Surfclam and Ocean Quahog Fishery; Amendment 13 to the Surfclam and Ocean
Quahog Fishery Management Plan, 68 Fed. Reg. 55,358, 55,361 (Sep. 25, 2003) (Section
648.71 of this National Marine Fisheries Service amendment sets authority to adjust quotas
and limits length of time to three years.).
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fishery reports and the administrative record, to set new rules imposing
similar quota limits on small entities.100
For example, in a 1993 fisheries rulemaking, the Department of
Commerce set pollock fishing seasons that prohibited pollock fishing
between April 2nd and May 31st. 101 This season was later amended in 1996
to restrict fishing from April 16th through August 31st, and from November
2nd through December 31st. 102 The current rule is more permissive,
containing longer fishing seasons than the 1996 revisions, but it is still
more restrictive than the 1993 pollock fishing rule.103 If one agrees with
Commerce’s 1993 conclusion that the original pollock fishery season rule
could impose significant economic burdens on a substantial number of
small entities, and that it would trigger section 610 review responsibilities
on the part of the agency, Commerce would likely claim that the 1993
rulemaking was superseded by the 1996 amendment and subsequent
actions. Not surprisingly, all fourteen of the final rules published by the
Department of Commerce in 1993 were fisheries regulations, and none of
these rules appear to have been reviewed under section 610 of the RFA.104
Many of these rules, however, set baselines for regulatory compliance for
subsequent rules, and small entities are still required to comply with
them. 105
2. Agencies Do Not Appear to Review All Rules Which Have a
Significant Economic Impact on a Substantial Number of Small Entities
Section 610 only requires agencies to periodically review those rules that
“have or will have a significant economic impact upon a substantial
number of small entities.” 106 Agencies interpret this section differently.
Some, like EPA, do not review a rule at all unless, at the time of its final
publication, the agency had determined that it would have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.107 Others, such
as Department of Transportation, take a fresh look at the old rule and make
100. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1851 (national standards requiring plans to be set to achieve
optimum fish yield and be based on the best scientific information available), 1852(h)(5)
(requiring fishery management councils to continuously review fish yields), 1853(a)
(requiring fishery management plans to take fish status information into account).
101. 58 Fed. Reg. 16,786, 16,787 (Mar. 31, 1993).
102. 61 Fed. Reg. 39601, 39,602 (July 30, 1996).
103. 50 C.F.R. § 679.23(d)(2) (2005).
104. See supra tbl.1
105. 16 U.S.C. § 1857.
106. 5 U.S.C. § 610(a).
107. EPA, REVISED INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 35, at 82 (“Only rules that were
subject to the RFA and were not certified, are subject to § 610 review.”).
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a threshold determination as to whether the rule currently has a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.108
a.

Agencies Often Originally Certify Rules That Should Not Be Certified

As illustrated above, agencies promulgate a large number of rules that
the agencies certified under the RFA, at the time of their publication, as not
likely to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities. 109 This fact is important because some agencies instruct
personnel conducting section 610 reviews that if a rule was certified at the
time of its publication, then it should not be considered for section 610
review. 110 This practice leads to rules being excluded from section 610
review which may have actually had a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities at the time of their
publication. Historically, agencies often denied that their rules harm small
entities, even despite contrary evidence.111 The trigger for an agency’s
section 610 duty to periodically review a rule is whether or not the agency
has determined the rule would have a “significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.” 112 Unfortunately, ambiguity found
within the RFA itself has allowed agencies to avoid reviewing rules which
arguably harm small entities by routinely certifying rules without adequate
factual basis, and by ignoring the current harmful effects of a rule in favor
of agency determinations made before the rule was promulgated.
Under the RFA, agencies make a threshold determination of the
potential impacts of a rule on small entities.113 If the agency determines
that the rule would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities, then the agency may certify the rule as such, and
avoid the regulatory flexibility analyses required by the RFA. 114 Upon
such a determination, however, the agency must provide the certification to

108. GAO, AGENCIES’ INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 82, at 11-12 (“[O]fficials said DOT
must review all of its rules within 10 years of their issuance to determine whether they have
a SEISNSE [significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities] at the
time of the review.”).
109. See supra Part III.A.2 tbl.1.
110. See, e.g., NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERVS., supra note 96, § II (noting that only
rules published with FRFAs are subject to section 610 review).
111. See, e.g., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT: KEY TERMS
STILL
NEED
TO
BE
CLARIFIED
3-6
(2001),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01669t.pdf (GAO analysis of an EPA decision to certify a
single rule, as well as a discussion of agency-wide certification practice).
112. 5 U.S.C. § 610(c) (2000).
113. 5 U.S.C. § 605(b) (2000).
114. § 605(b).
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the public in the Federal Register at the same time as the proposed or final
rule, along with the factual bases the agency relied on in making the
determination. 115 When an agency thus certifies a rule, it is not required to
conduct a review of the rule’s impact to small entities at a later date.116
This statutory scheme avoids requiring agencies to spend taxpayer
resources and valuable agency time reviewing rules for which such analysis
is not likely to benefit small entities. Agencies, however, regularly certify
rules under the RFA as not having a significant economic impact to a
substantial number of small entities despite indications in favor of a
contrary finding. 117
The problem stems from the lack of definitions in the RFA for the terms
“significant economic impact” and “substantial number.” Some agencies
routinely certify rules by adopting standards for these terms which result in
every rule being certified.118 The rationale behind such action is twofold.
115. § 605(b).
116. 5 U.S.C. § 610(a) (2000).
117. For example, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service promulgates many rules designating
large land areas as critical habitat for endangered species. Although the SBA’s Office of
Advocacy regularly comments on the impacts of these rules, and has informed the FWS on a
number of occasions that rules were not properly certified, the FWS has never completed a
regulatory flexibility analysis and continues to certify every designation of land as critical
habitat as not having a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas M. Sullivan, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S.
Small Bus. Admin., to Craig Manson, Assistant Sec’y for Fish, Wildlife & Parks, U.S. Dep’t
of
Interior
(July
14,
2005),
available
at
http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/comments/fws05_0714.pdf (recommending withdrawal of
designation of critical habitat for the Southwestern willow flycatcher and republication with
regulatory flexibility analysis); Letter from Thomas M. Sullivan, Chief Counsel for
Advocacy, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., to Craig Manson, Assistant Sec’y for Fish, Wildlife &
Parks,
U.S.
Dep’t
of
Interior
(Mar.
29,
2005),
available
at
http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/comments/fws05_0329.pdf (recommending publication with
regulatory flexibility analysis for designation of critical habitat for the Southwestern willow
flycatcher); Letter from Thomas M. Sullivan, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Bus.
Admin., to Steven Spangle, Field Supervisor, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. (June 27, 2003),
available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/comments/fws03_0627.pdf (recommending
publication of regulatory flexibility analysis for designation of critical habitat for the pygmy
owl).
118. One ongoing example of this practice is again found in the experience of the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, which routinely tailors its economic analysis to result in a
conclusion that the rule analyzed will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities—even in the face of conflicting precedent. See, e.g.,
N.C. Fisheries Ass’n v. Daley, 27 F. Supp. 2d 650, 660-61 (E.D. Va.) (stating that RFA
certification amounted to “willful blindness” because the agency measured economic
impacts as a percentage of income to all fishermen, rather than only those regulated);
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Establishment of Three Additional
Manatee Protection Areas in Florida, 68 Fed. Reg. 16,602, 16,617 (Apr. 4, 2003) (codified
at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (adopting test for “significant economic impact” that divides the total
small business economic impact into the total personal income for every industry in the
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First, the agency avoids being required to conduct regulatory flexibility
analyses which consume agency resources and could support a regulatory
alternative other than that which the agency favors. Second, agencies avoid
any requirement to ever review their rules, and can conserve agency
resources later on.
In 1992, the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA surveyed federal
agencies to determine agency compliance with section 610 of the RFA.119
Forty-four percent of federal agencies claimed that they had never
promulgated rules which would have had a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities, and hence, were not required to
conduct reviews under section 610. 120 In 2001, CONSAD Research
Corporation released a report indicating that agency compliance with the
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) and FRFA requirements
went up in the years between 1995 and 1999. 121 A representative sample
of agency regulators certified a smaller percentage of their rules in 1999
than they did in 1995. 122 In 1995, agencies completed a FRFA for eighteen
percent of the final rules sampled, whereas in 1999, agencies completed
FRFAs in forty-nine percent of the rules. 123 At the same time, Congress
amended the RFA in 1996 to require agencies to provide the factual bases
for their certification statements and to provide the right of judicial review
to regulated small entities regarding those certification decisions.124
b. Some Rules That Were Originally Certified Currently Have
Significant Economic Impacts on Substantial Numbers of Small Entities
The second reason for the disproportionate number of section 610
reviews is that agencies often claim that an original rule turned out not to
have a significant economic impact on small entities. Agencies are
affected area, predictably finding that, though a rule might force every small business in a
specific industry in the area into insolvency, the resulting impacts are “insignificant” with
respect to the total gross product of the area); see also Letter from Thomas M. Sullivan,
Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., to David Hankla, Field Supervisor,
U.S.
Fish
&
Wildlife
Serv.
(June
3,
2003),
available
at
http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/comments/fws03_0603.pdf (informing FWS that a proposed
rule had employed an improper test under the RFA to conclude in a finding that there was
no significant economic impact).
119. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT: STATUS OF
AGENCIES’ COMPLIANCE 13 (1994), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat3/151400.pdf.
120. See id. at 14-15.
121. CONSAD RESEARCH CORP., supra note 87, at 1.
122. Id. at 18.
123. Id.
124. Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat.
857 (1996).
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required by the RFA to implement plans for periodic regulatory review, 125
but some, like the EPA, have adopted plans for review which require
agency officials to review only those rules which were not certified at the
time of their publication. 126 Other agencies, like the Department of
Transportation, claim to review their rules at the time of the periodic
reviews in an initial screening analysis to determine if the rule currently
has a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. 127 Given the very low level of section 610 reviews, it is likely that
some rules are mischaracterized by agency officials during the section 610
review “screening” as not significant or affecting an insubstantial number
of small entities.
3.

Agencies May Simply Neglect (or be Unable) to Fulfill Their Statutory
Duties

Third, some rules may have been neglected due to a lack of institutional
memory at agencies, an unfamiliarity with the RFA, or an absence of staff
necessary to complete section 610 reviews. Since it is impossible to
provide evidence to prove such assumptions, it would appear proper to
assume that this would account for very few section 610 review failures.
Since, however, even the agency that deals with small business issues on a
daily basis appeared astoundingly unfamiliar with the RFA in the early
1990s, 128 it is not unreasonable to believe that at least a handful of rules
were not reviewed as a result of some institutional shortcoming or
oversight.
B.

The Causes for the Failure of Section 610 to Achieve Regulatory
Burden Reduction for Small Entities

Even when agencies correctly identify rules which harm small business
and agree to review them, these reviews are often not sufficiently detailed
to produce the benefits the RFA envisioned. In other instances, reviews
have the exact opposite effect of that intended by the RFA, where the
agency labels a regulatory action a section 610 review, even though the

125. 5 U.S.C. § 610(a) (2000).
126. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
128. The SBA published one rule in 1993 which the agency identified as likely to have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. For this rule, the
agency misidentified its regulatory flexibility analysis as a “regulatory eligibility [sic]
analysis” and appears to have simply copied its “initial regulatory eligibility [sic] analysis,”
typo included, into its final rule. SBA Small Business Size Standards; Business Loan
Program; Alternative Size Standard, 58 Fed. Reg. 12,334, 12,334 (Mar. 4, 1993).
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purpose of the rulemaking is to impose further burdens on small entities.
1.

Agencies Are Not Required to Act in Response to Section 610 Reviews

Section 610 requires agencies to conduct a “review” of rules ten years
after their final publication. Agencies are instructed to the following effect:
Each year, each agency shall publish in the Federal Register a list of the
rules which have a significant economic impact on a substantial number
of small entities, which are to be reviewed pursuant to this section
during the succeeding twelve months. The list shall include a brief
description of each rule and the need for and legal basis of such rule and
shall invite public comment upon the rule.129
Thus, section 610 does not require the agency to re-promulgate rules, nor
does it require the agency to even publish the results of its “review.” In
fact, in almost all cases, the only indicator to the public that a rule was
actually reviewed is the notice published in the Unified Agenda.130 It is
unsurprising, then, that the vast majority of section 610 reviews conclude
with no agency action—and hence, no small entity regulatory relief.131
2.

Agencies Are Not Required to Provide Meaningful Opportunity for
Public Involvement During Section 610 Review

The law as currently constituted does not appear to provide a meaningful
opportunity for public involvement in the section 610 review process.

129. 5 U.S.C. § 610(c) (2000).
130. The notable exception to the rule is the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, which publishes lengthy reports on the results of its completed section 610
reviews on its website. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Admin.,
Lookback
Reviews
(2005),
http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/compliance_assistance/lookback.html.
While these reports
invariably conclude that the rule could not be adjusted to reduce burdens on small entities,
and do not acknowledge that the rules impose costs on the regulated public, they are
informative and go into great detail on the benefits of the regulation. See, e.g., Regulatory
Review of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s Ethylene Oxide Standard,
29
C.F.R.
§
1910.1047
(2005),
available
at
http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/compliance_assistance/lookback/ethylene_oxide_lookback.pdf.
131. Even starker, the majority of actions agencies actually do identify as being taken in
response to a section 610 review should probably not be classified as such. As section III
outlines, it appears far more likely that an agency action that is claimed to be in response to
a section 610 review will increase small entity burdens, rather than decrease them. See
supra Part III.B. This leads to the conclusion that at least some of these rules were not
actually promulgated in the course of an agency effort to reduce existing small entity
burdens. Hence, agencies appear to be truly acting to reduce small entity burdens in
response to a very small percentage of completed section 610 reviews (approximately ten
percent). See supra tbl.2.
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Section 610 does not require agencies to provide the public with notice that
a review is currently underway, nor is the agency required to alert the
public as to when the review will be completed. Agencies must only
annually “publish in the Federal Register a list of the rules which have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities,
which are to be reviewed pursuant to this section during the succeeding
twelve months.” 132
As a result, most agencies do not publish notices in the Federal Register
informing the public that rule review is currently underway, apart from a
notice that the rule may be reviewed sometime within the next twelve
months, nor do the agencies actively solicit comments on issues being
reviewed. 133 Section 610 reviews carry forward from one Unified Agenda
to the next, with some agencies putting off section 610 reviews time and
again. 134 In addition, because the section 610 review notices are only
published in the Federal Register, they may go unnoticed by large numbers
of potentially affected small entities.

132. 5 U.S.C. § 610(c) (2000).
133. Some agencies occasionally publish notices in the Federal Register alerting the
public to an open 610 review, but this is not common practice, and even when agencies
publish notices, they do not do so consistently. See, e.g., OSHA Notice of a Regulatory
Flexibility Act Review of Lead in Construction, 70 Fed. Reg. 32,739 (June 6, 2005) (to be
codified at C.F.R. pt. 1926). Such notices must also be balanced against agencies that take a
different approach to soliciting public participation, declining to include their notices in the
Unified Agenda to make sure the notices are reflected in the index to section 610 reviews,
and instead occasionally publishing all their section 610 review notices as a long list of
C.F.R. sections that might be reviewed sometime in the future. The FCC Possible Revision
or Elimination of Rules, 70 Fed. Reg. 33,416 (June 8, 2005), provides a pertinent example.
It provides a massive list of C.F.R. sections which reached their respective ten-year
anniversaries sometime between 2002 and 2005, with no discussion of the extent each
section had a continuing need, and no discussion of the agency’s thoughts on changed
circumstances. Further, there was no mention of any complaints received about each
section, apart from a statement of purpose that appears copied and pasted from each original
rule.
134. One notable example is OSHA, which twice published section 610 review notices
for two separate rules in every Unified Agenda for four years. See, e.g., Seminannual
Agenda of Regulations, 65 Fed. Reg. 23,014, 23,081 (Apr. 24, 2000) (OSHA “Control of
Hazardous Energy Sources (Lockout/Tagout) (Completion of a Section 610 Review)”);
Semiannual Agenda of Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 62,748, 62,778 (Nov. 29, 1996) (OSHA
“Control of Hazardous Energy Sources (Lockout/Tagout) (Section 610 Review)”). While
such extended dedication to considering small entity impacts is surely commendable, it is
likely that the extended nature of these notices reduced their value to the public in alerting
regulated entities that the agency was actually in the process of reviewing the rule.
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Agencies Often Label Regulatory Action as Rulemaking in Response
to Section 610 Review to Satisfy the Letter of the Law, Though the
Rulemaking is Intended to Impose New Burdens on Small Entities

The weakness of the actual requirements of section 610 becomes
apparent when one surveys the results of section 610 reviews. As
discussed above, agencies report that they have conducted a large number
of reviews over the past twenty-five years, but regulatory actions in
response to these reviews are few and far between. 135 When agencies do
propose an action that is identified as a response to a section 610 review,
however, most often it will actually increase the regulatory burden on
small business.
A prime example of such improper labeling is the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration’s (FMCSA) 2003 final rule, Transportation of
Household Goods. 136 In this rulemaking, the agency did not explain how
the rule incorporated the non-public section 610 review that the agency
claimed the rule was in response to. In fact, the rule introduced new
requirements that, among other things, increased the paperwork burden for
each small entity by five hundred hours, approximately a sixty percent
increase, even though it was certified as not having a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities.137 FMCSA did not
discuss what regulatory alternatives were available to reduce the new rule’s
impacts on small entities or why the agency did not adopt those
alternatives. The rulemaking record did not support the conclusion that the
agency was acting to reduce the existing regulation’s impact on small
entities, nor that the agency had previously completed a periodic review
with the goal of reducing burdens to small entities. It is difficult to
conclude that the agency was acting on the results of a completed section
610 review, rather than simply imposing new regulatory obligations under
the auspices of a section 610 review that should have been completed prior
to the rulemaking.138

135. See supra Part III.B.
136. FMCSA Transportation of Household Goods; Consumer Protection Regulations, 68
Fed. Reg. 35,064 (June 11, 2003) (codified at C.F.R. pts. 375 & 377).
137. Id. at 35,088.
138. It seems almost unfair to single FMCSA out for promulgating such rules “in
response to a section 610 review.” Other agencies also often claim that large or
disproportionately costly rules are actually the result of a section 610 review. See, e.g.,
Veterinary Diagnostic Services User Fees, 69 Fed. Reg. 25,305 (May 6, 2004) (after issuing
a rule that increased inspection fees to small entities, agency responded to a comment from
an export inspector who claimed that the rule would make his operation unprofitable by
telling him if the increase put him out of business, another exporter would be able to take
over for him); FCC Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer
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CURRENT LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO REFORM SECTION 610
A.

The House and Senate Bills

There are currently two bills pending in the House of Representatives
and the Senate which are designed in part to address the ongoing issues
with section 610 review. As discussed above, Congress has attempted in
the past to address the serious problems with implementation of section 610
of the RFA. 139
The Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act 140 was introduced in the
House of Representatives by Small Business Committee Chairman Donald
Manzullo (Ill.-16) on February 9, 2005. The Senate Small Business
Committee Chairwoman, Senator Olympia Snowe (ME), introduced the
Regulatory Flexibility Reform Act of 2005 on July 13, 2005. 141 The bills
amend section 610 in an almost identical fashion.
House Bill 682 would provide for a new regulatory authority for the
Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA to issue regulations that interpret
the provisions of the RFA, including section 610. 142 This regulatory
authority could be exercised to adopt some of the recommendations made
below regarding how the RFA should be interpreted. For example, some
clear authority could be provided on the subject of whether amending
existing rules “restarts the clock” for purposes of section 610 review. 143
For some of these recommendations, the existing statute does not make
clear that they could be adopted properly through regulation. Therefore,
this paper not only highlights the potential application of House Bill 682’s
regulatory authority provision, but because the legislation is pending and
Congress currently has an opportunity to directly address the ongoing
problems with section 610, the majority of these recommendations focus on

Protection Act of 1991, 68 Fed. Reg. 44,144 (July 25, 2003) (rule introduced wide-ranging
new prohibitions on small entities soliciting business by phone and fax that imposed major
costs, including new “do not call” lists businesses would be required to purchase, blanket
prohibitions on faxes, record keeping requirements, and other provisions); Government
Contractors: Affirmative Action Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 68,022 (Nov. 13, 2000) (after
issuing final rule imposing new reporting requirement for all small business government
contractors estimated to impose more than 1,000,000 hours of annual paperwork burden,
agency certified rule as not having significant economic impact on substantial number of
small entities and dismissed comments challenging agency’s characterization of existing
burdens).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23, 124.
140. Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act, H.R. 682, 109th Cong. (2005).
141. Regulatory Flexibility Reform Act of 2005, S. 1388, 109th Cong. (2005).
142. See H.R. 682 § 10 (amending Chapter 6 of Title 5 to add 5 U.S.C. § 613).
143. See id.
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direct action by Congress.
B.

The Potential Effects of Pending Legislation on Low Review Rates

The pending legislation would appear to resolve the agency certification
issue and make strides towards reducing agency neglect of section 610
responsibilities. Neither Act, however, appears to directly solve the issue
of when the timeframe for review begins running, or whether it is tolled by
amendments to final rules, or otherwise affected by subsequent agency
actions.
1.

Pending Legislation Does Not Directly Address the Problem of
“Restarting the Clock”

Neither bill directly addresses the issue of what a “rule” is for the
purposes of section 610 review. Both retain the language of the current
section 610, for which the term “rule” would continue to be defined in 5
U.S.C. § 601 as an agency action required to be promulgated through
notice and comment rulemaking.144 House Bill 682 would appear to grant
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy the authority to further define “rule” for
purposes of section 610. 145
2.

Pending Legislation Would Answer the Question as to When Agencies
Should Determine If a Rule Has a Significant Economic Impact on a
Substantial Number of Small Entities

Both House Bill 682 and Senate Bill 1388 would address the open
question as to whether a rule must be reviewed under section 610 if it was
originally published with a certification. House Bill 682 and Senate Bill
1388 provide that an agency must review any rule that “the head of the
agency determines has a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities” and further state that “[s]uch determination shall
be made without regard to whether the agency performed an analysis under
section 604.” 146
Thus, the bills would require all agencies to review all rules to determine
whether the rule was currently having a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.

144. See S. 1388 § 5; H.R. 682 § 7. H.R. 682, however, would expand the definition of
“rule” to include a number of specialized agency actions not currently considered by those
agencies to be “rules.” See H.R. 682 § 3.
145. See H.R. 682 § 10 (“[T]he Chief Counsel for Advocacy shall . . . issue rules
governing agency compliance with this chapter.”).
146. S. 1388 § 5 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 610(a)); H.R. 682 § 7 (same).
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Pending Legislation Addresses Agency Neglect by Requiring
Publication of Agency Plans to Conduct Section 610 Reviews

The pending legislation sets a definite timetable for the rectification of
agency neglect of section 610 reviews. Under both bills, agencies would
be required to publish a plan for review of all existing regulations within
the next ten years. 147 In addition, they both contain provisions which
would require every agency to “annually submit a report regarding the
results of its review . . . to Congress and, in the case of agencies other than
independent regulatory agencies . . . to the Administrator of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs of the Office of Management and
Budget.” 148 Assuming that Congress and OIRA followed up with at least
minimal oversight of the reports, this reporting provision can be anticipated
to persuade agencies to devote more attention to the need for section 610
reviews and to greatly reduce inadvertent non-compliance. In addition, the
oversight would encourage agencies to devote agency resources to
reviewing rules, thus reducing the number of agencies that engage in pro
forma exercises labeled as section 610 reviews.
Both bills, however, would alter the current requirement that agencies
publish a list of rules “to be reviewed pursuant to this section during the
succeeding twelve months,” 149 and replace it with language which does not
set a time restraint on the agency. 150 While this notice requirement could
be read to require agencies to publish notice at the same time as their
section 610 review, it is unclear if this will occur, as current OIRA and
Regulatory Information Service Center guidance instructs agencies to
submit their section 610 review notices to the Unified Agenda twice per
year. 151
C. The Potential Shortcomings of Pending Legislation on the Overall
Failure of Section 610 to Result in Any Reduction of Unnecessary
Regulatory Burdens
Although the legislative changes proposed would be a helpful first step,
they would likely actually do little to encourage agency action to reduce
small entity burdens beyond that incorporated in the current, ineffective

147. S. 1388 § 5 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 610(b)); H.R. 682 § 7 (same).
148. S. 1388 § 5 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 610(c)); H.R. 682 § 7 (same).
149. 5 U.S.C. § 610(c) (2000).
150. S. 1388 § 5 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 610(c)); H.R. 682 § 7 (same).
151. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs to the
Regulatory Policy Officers at Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies and Managing and Exec. Dirs. of
Certain Agencies and Comm’ns, Attachment 1 (June 10, 1997) (offering guidelines for
agencies with respect to the creation of an index for section 610 reviews) (on file with
author).
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version of section 610. No provisions of the House and Senate bills require
agencies to act— or even to provide the public with the contents of final
decisions to not act—under section 610. While the web page publication
requirement may increase small entity exposure to section 610 reforms, the
lack of a requirement tying notice to an actual, ongoing review reduces the
notice’s value in facilitating a forum for meaningful public comment. The
legislation introduces no new requirements limiting agency designation of
regulatory acts as in response to a completed section 610 review.
1.

Pending Legislation Does Not Require Agencies to Take Any Action in
Response to Completed Reviews

The pending legislation would not require agencies to act in response to
their section 610 reviews. 152 While both would require new reports to
Congress and OIRA on the results of these reviews, neither requires
agencies to publish a regulatory proposal based on the results of the review
or any notice to the public upon the completion of the review. Since the
bills would make no change as to post-review publication requirements, the
current practice of filing notice of intent to review a rule would continue to
suffice for purposes of section 610 compliance. 153
2.

Pending Legislation Does Not Add a Meaningful Opportunity for
Public Involvement in Section 610 Reviews

The legislation would not require agencies to allow the public to
comment with a notice that the review was currently underway. As with
the current section 610, the bills would only require the publication of
notice that a rule would be subject to review at some point.154
Furthermore, there is no provision to prevent agencies from carrying over
notices from year to year (other than the ten-year review deadline itself),
and the message of the need for small entities to become involved could be
diluted.
The bills, however, take a very positive step in the direction of providing
the public with information on ongoing reviews. House Bill 682 and
Senate Bill 1388 would both require agencies to post their notices online,

152. Both bills retain the simple requirement to file notice of intent to review a rule with
no subsequent post-review publication requirements, though both require a new report to
Congress and/or the OIRA on the results of reviews. See S. 1388 § 5; H.R. 682 § 7.
153. See 5 U.S.C.§ 610(c) (2000); see also S. 1388 § 5; H.R. 682 § 7.
154. See S. 1388 § 5 (adding 5 U.S.C. § 610(e): “The agency shall publish in the Federal
Register and on its Web site a list of rules to be reviewed pursuant to such plan.”); H.R. 682
§ 7 (same).
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thus affording the public more reasonable notice.155 Depending on the
popularity and usability of agency web sites, this provision should increase
the visibility of section 610 reviews.
3.

Pending Legislation Does Not Address the Agency Use of Regulatory
Actions to Satisfy the Review Requirement

It is unclear whether the proposed legislation would do much to deter
agencies from labeling regulatory actions as satisfying section 610 review
requirements or arising from section 610 reviews. As discussed above, the
legislation would introduce no new requirement for agency action in
response to completed internal reviews. 156 Section 610 currently already
states that the “purpose of the review shall be to determine whether rules
should be continued without change, or should be amended or
rescinded . . . to minimize any significant economic impacts of the rules on
a substantial number of small entities.” 157 The House and Senate bills
retain this language, with the House bill adding a second purpose, to
“maximize any significant beneficial economic impacts.” 158
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATION TO ADDRESS THE
IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED IN THIS ARTICLE
The currently pending legislation addresses some of the problems
underlying the general low rates of agency review under section 610. This
Article makes additional recommendations based on the results of its
review of agency practices and the general failure of the current section
610 to result in any significant benefit to small entities.
A. Recommendation to Address Low Review Rates: Legislation
Should Directly Address the Question of How Subsequent Amendment
of a Rule Affects the Ten-Year Periodic Review Timetable
Regardless of the method chosen to address the problem of no
reductions of regulatory burdens, legislation should solve the problem of
low review rates by including a clause explicitly stating when the tolling of
the ten-year period begins, and what rulemakings are to be included within
the review. This Article also recommends tailoring the remedies available
for agency noncompliance to ensure that agencies conduct the reviews

155.
156.
157.
158.

See S. 1388 § 5; H.R. 682 § 7.
See supra text accompanying notes 152-153.
5 U.S.C. § 610(a) (2000).
S. 1388 § 5 (amending 5 U.S.C. §610(a)); H.R. 682 § 7 (same).
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required of them.
1.

Legislation Should Further Clarify When the Ten-Year Period Begins
and Ends

The following sentence originates from the legislation’s proposed
section 610(b), with additional text by the author in brackets and italics:
(b) The plan shall provide for the review of all such agency rules existing
on the date of the enactment of the Regulatory Flexibility Improvements
Act within 10 years of the date of publication of the plan in the Federal
Register and for review of rules adopted after the date of enactment of the
Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act within 10 years after the
publication of the final rule in the Federal Register. 159 [Should
subsequent amendment of the rule impose a significant economic burden
on a substantial number of small entities, the later action shall be
reviewed in conjunction with the original final rule ten years after the
promulgation of the original final rule and every ten years thereafter.]

Such a provision would allow for efficient review of all the regulation as
it currently exists, make clear the timetable for the review, and establish a
baseline date for estimating future reviews of the code sections.
Since the problem of “restarting the clock” stems from agencies’
interpretations of the language in section 610, House Bill 682’s grant of
regulatory authority could also indirectly address the issue. Upon passage
of the current version of House Bill 682, the Chief Counsel for Advocacy
could clarify the effect of subsequent amendment of a final rule on the way
agencies are to calculate the ten year period referred to in the statute, using
language similar to that proposed here for inclusion in pending legislation.
Such implementing regulation would not establish new duties for agencies
not found in the statute itself, so it would appear equally appropriate to
address the issue either through express statutory language or through the
grant of regulatory authority to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy. Since the
opportunity is present for Congress to address the issue directly, however,
this Article recommends that Congress itself act to resolve ambiguity.
2.

Legislation Should Improve Available Remedies to Ensure Agencies
Conduct Required Reviews

What penalty should be imposed for agency refusal to implement section
610? Agencies’ compliance patterns demonstrate that they are willing to
routinely ignore the RFA’s section 610 requirement, although it is

159. See H.R. 682 § 7 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 610(b)).
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judicially reviewable. 160 Small entities and their trade associations are
currently not willing to devote hundreds of thousands of dollars to forcing
pro forma section 610 review notices to be published in the Unified
Agenda, but would they enforce their rights if a challenge could force the
agencies to provide meaningful public participation through notice and
comment rulemaking?
Currently, it is not clear whether small entities or their trade associations
would challenge agency failure to comply with section 610 if notice and
comment rulemaking were required. It is instructive to recall that today,
small entities and trade associations are permitted to petition for
rulemaking under the Administrative Procedures Act,161 yet they do not do
so. The current remedy for a section 610 violation—a judicial order to an
agency to publish a notice in the Unified Agenda that, at some point in the
next twelve months, the agency will complete an internal review—could
not possibly justify the expense of retaining counsel, filing an action, and
following up with the agency to ensure that the agency complied with a
court order. Once the remedy becomes a reopening of the rulemaking and
public participation, it may be that more trade associations are willing to
expend funds to challenge onerous regulatory requirements.
This Article concludes, however, that the agency section 610 compliance
patterns demonstrate a widespread and continuing problem. Forcing small
entities to seek a court order to force review is unlikely to provide
sufficient incentive to regulated entities, as agencies currently face just
such a remedy, 162 but have ignored their responsibilities. The main remedy
for complete failure to complete a periodic review under section 610 should
not be a court order to complete section 610 review. Rather, agencies
should be put on notice that failure to review rules under section 610 will
be fatal to the underlying rule itself.
Thus, the remedy section of the RFA should specify that a vacation of
the underlying rule is the sole remedy for violation of section 610, with no
judicial discretion to allow the agency to continue enforcing the rule
pending an allegedly forthcoming section 610 review. To this end, as
discussed below, I recommend the addition of a new subsection (f) of
section 610 which reads as follows:

160. See 5 U.S.C. § 611(a) (2000) (“For any rule subject to this chapter, a small entity
that is adversely affected or aggrieved by final agency action is entitled to judicial review of
agency compliance with the requirements of [section] 610 . . . .”).
161. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2000).
162. 5 U.S.C. § 611(a) (2000) (providing for review of agency failure to comply with
section 610 and setting basic remedy as remand of rule with deferred enforcement against
small entities).
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(f) Rules for which the agency has not published a general notice of
proposed rulemaking upon the expiration of ten years or final rule upon
the expiration of eleven years from the date of their initial publication in
the Federal Register shall lapse and become unenforceable. Provided, an
agency may continue enforcement of a lapsed rule once for a period of not
more than twelve months from the publication of a determination in the
Federal Register stating that the lapse of the rule would have a significant
negative impact to human health or safety, along with the factual basis for
such determination. 163

The purpose of this subsection would be to “sunset” those rules for
which the agency ignored its responsibility to conduct periodic review, and
the language would ensure compliance with the notice and comment
requirement suggested below. The provision would allow an agency to
publish its notice of proposed rulemaking sometime before the expiration
of ten years, but to delay publication of the final rule for up to one year
after the statutory ten-year review period, allowing for more than adequate
time for timely and sufficient consideration of the record. Also, for those
significant rules that the agency has overlooked and inadvertently allowed
to lapse, the agency may keep them in effect, provided the agency can
show that the absence of the rule would have a significant negative impact
on human health or safety.
While sunsetting a rule for which an agency has refused to conduct
periodic review may seem an overly harsh penalty, analysis of the record
shows that traditional judicial remedies have proven almost completely
ineffective at ensuring that agencies conduct such reviews. Legal
challenges to agencies’ failures to comply may increase in number once
judicial remedies become more likely to encourage public participation, but
given that agencies have had a quarter of a century to bring themselves into
compliance, it is unlikely that agencies will adopt better compliance
regimes without more substantive penalties. Further, for those rules which
temporarily lapse and during that time could have serious implications, the
new language would provide a mechanism for an agency to immediately
reinstitute the effectiveness of the rule, pending forthcoming periodic
review.

163. See infra Part VI.B.1.
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B. Recommendation to Address Section 610’s Overall Failure to
Reduce Unnecessary Regulatory Burdens: Legislation Should
Introduce a Requirement for Agencies to Conduct Some Public
Process in Response to a Completed Section 610 Review
As illustrated above, the most likely current outcome of a section 610
review conducted internally within an agency is no action. 164 It is clear
that federal agencies are unlikely to reduce regulatory burdens on small
entities following section 610 reviews. For section 610 to be a truly
effective periodic review requirement, however, it must contain a provision
which requires agencies to open their process to the public in some fashion
and come to a final public and judicially-reviewable decision. This Article
identifies four such options: (1) notice and comment rulemaking every ten
years, (2) notice and comment rulemaking in response to a petition from
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy, (3) small entity review panels similar to
those currently conducted in EPA and OSHA rulemakings, and (4) a
combination of section 610 reviews and Paperwork Reduction Act reviews,
and oversight by OMB and the SBA’s Office of Advocacy. 165 The Article
concludes that the adoption of option (1), requiring notice and comment
rulemaking for periodic reviews, would be the most effective and efficient
option available, but leaves open the possibility of combining this
rulemaking process with small entity review panels discussed in option (3).
Since all of these options would introduce new duties on agencies not
currently found in section 610, it appears that the adoption of any of them
would require legislation, as opposed to relying on House Bill 682’s grant
of regulatory authority to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy.
1.

Mandatory Notice and Comment Rulemaking Every Ten Years

One option to ensure agency action is to require the agency to reopen
every rulemaking to notice and comment every ten years, with the stated
goal of minimizing the significant economic impact of the rules on a
substantial number of small entities. This would be accomplished by tying
section 610 review to the Administrative Procedure Act section 553 “notice
and comment” procedure, and suspending the effect of those rules which
164. See supra Part III.B.
165. In a 1996 paper on periodic review of existing rules, Neil Eisner and Judith Kaleta
discussed a number of options for periodic review, including periodic “clean up” reviews,
multiagency reviews, reviews by broad categories, and reviews by affected groups. See Neil
R. Eisner & Judith S. Kaleta, Federal Agency Reviews of Existing Regulations, 48 ADMIN.
L. REV. 139, 160-61 (1996). Although these categories of review have much to recommend
them, this paper is focused on changes to existing law which could bring about a legally
enforceable review requirement, and these categories are not reviewed here.
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are not thus reopened to public participation within a set time frame. Such
a rulemaking would consist of the agency identifying all significant
regulatory alternatives which would reduce small entity burdens and
requesting comment on the alternatives. Since the proposed and final rule
would be required to comply with section 553 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, the action would also trigger the RFA’s analysis
requirements.
This option has a number of benefits. First, agencies would be forced to
explain, in a form subject to judicial review, their reasoning as to why rules
should remain in effect without change. Currently, agencies are not
required to publish any final results or explanation of the outcome of a
section 610 review. 166 Hence, most publish nothing on completed reviews,
and those agencies that do so rarely publish more than a general statement
that “[t]he agency received no comment on the action and has concluded
that the rule needs no revisions to minimize impacts on small entities.”167
In a notice and comment rulemaking, agencies would be held to at least an
arbitrary and capricious standard that required them to explain why they
felt no revisions were necessary in the face of industry comments to the
contrary. Though this standard is not difficult to meet, current agency
explanations as to why small entity burden reductions are unnecessary or
impracticable would probably not even meet the arbitrary and capricious
standard if used in notice and comment rulemaking.
Second, small entities would be guaranteed an opportunity to provide
written comments and participate in the review. Currently, agencies only
provide one notice that a review will be conducted sometime in the next
twelve months. 168 Small entities are not aware whether the review is
scheduled for the following week or the last week of the eleventh month
after the notice. Nor are they provided answers to their comments, as
agencies are not required to publish any formal response. Agencies are
unlikely to provide reasonable consideration to public comments to which
they are not required to respond.
Third, an agency required to conduct a notice and comment rulemaking

166. Review under the current section 610 is akin to the long-neglected requirements
found in some agency manuals ordering periodic reviews with no public input or released
results. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, DEPARTMENTAL MANUAL 8.2A (1998), available
at http://elips.doi.gov/elips/DM_word/3212.doc (“You must review each CFR part at least
every five years.”)
167. EPA Spring 2005 Regulatory Agenda, 70 Fed. Reg. 27,509, 27,615 (May 16, 2005)
(“Pesticide Worker Protection Standard (WPS) Rule (Completion of a Section 610
Review)”); see also EPA Fall 2004 Regulatory Agenda, 69 Fed. Reg. 73,875, 73,879 (Dec.
13, 2004) (listing completed section 610 reviews with no comments).
168. 5 U.S.C. § 610(c) (2000).
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is also required to comply with the regulatory flexibility analysis
requirements of the RFA. Sections 603 and 604 require agencies to
evaluate the impacts their actions could have on small entities, unless the
rule is certified under section 605(b). 169 This analysis would ensure that
agencies attempt to evaluate the current impacts of the rule, as opposed to
falling back on a pre-rulemaking economic analysis conducted ten years
prior.
Finally, notice and comment rulemaking requires the commitment of
resources. Agencies currently reduce the cost of section 610 review by
assigning small numbers of otherwise unoccupied staff to review rules.
Sometimes these staff members are knowledgeable of the ten-year-old rules
they are reviewing and are thus able to devote adequate consideration to the
problems small entities are facing, but usually they are not. The result is
pro forma review with boilerplate language, inadequate consideration of
the rule’s impact on regulated small entities, and no agency action to
Notice and comment
reduce small entity regulatory burdens. 170
rulemaking, on the other hand, exposes the agency to possible legal liability
and public scrutiny. 171 Agency officials will be forced to assign staff to
rulemaking who are capable of actually reviewing existing regulations in
an informed and conscientious manner. This is no small benefit, and would
likely prove to be the most important aspect of any notice and comment
rulemaking requirement.
Amending the RFA to order notice and comment rulemaking in section
610 reviews would not necessarily require large changes. The section 610
language of the currently pending legislation could be amended to add the
following new sections (e) and (f):
(e) The agency shall publish rules to be continued through notice and
comment rulemaking pursuant to section 553(b) of this title. The agency
shall publish in the Federal Register general notices of proposed
rulemaking and provide interested persons no less than sixty days to
participate in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views,
or arguments, with or without opportunity for oral presentation. In
addition to any other required information, general notices of proposed

169. 5 U.S.C. §§ 603, 604, 605.
170. See supra Part III.B.
171. One could argue that noncompliance with section 610 should also result in legal
liability. Due to the bare notice requirement of the current section 610, however, no small
entity is likely to expend the funds necessary to obtain a court order forcing an agency to
publish a short notice in the Unified Agenda that the rule will be reviewed internally
sometime within the next twelve months. Notice and comment rulemaking, on the other
hand, results in a final, public agency decision and a public administrative record which
must support the agency’s final decision.
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rulemaking shall include a section title, “Section 610 Review,” that
includes:
(1) a brief description of the rule,
(2) the reason why the agency has determined that it has a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities (without
regard to whether it had prepared a final regulatory flexibility
analysis for the rule), and
(3) regulatory alternatives the agency is considering with the
objectives of minimizing any significant economic impacts or
maximizing any significant beneficial economic impacts on a
substantial number of small entities.
(f) Rules for which the agency has not published a general notice of
proposed rulemaking upon the expiration of ten years or final rule upon
the expiration of eleven years from the date of their initial publication in
the Federal Register shall lapse and become unenforceable. Provided, an
agency may continue enforcement of a lapsed rule once for a period of not
more than twelve months from the publication of a determination in the
Federal Register stating that the lapse of the rule would have a significant
negative impact to human health or safety, along with the factual basis for
such determination.

Further, as discussed below, section 611 should also be amended to
include an entirely new sub-section:
(e) In granting relief in an action alleging violation of section 610 of this
section, the court shall vacate the rule, prohibit agency enforcement of the
rule against small entities, and remand it to the agency for notice and
comment rulemaking. The court shall not provide for continued
enforcement of the rule.

There are a number of considerations which arise with a notice and
comment rulemaking requirement, which I address below.
a.

Effects of the Recommendation on Agency Resources

One of the more prevalent arguments forwarded by agency officials in
response to the current RFA requirement that they at least determine how
much their rules could cost the regulated public is that their staff and
budget resources are limited, and that the agency is unable to afford the
cost of making such estimates. It does not appear, however, that the
proposed amendments for section 610 review would necessarily entail large
agency expenditures.
First, it must be remembered that section 610’s periodic review
requirement applies only to those rules which an agency has identified as
having a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
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entities. 172 For most agencies, the vast majority of their rules are not
designated as such (in many cases, properly so). For example, in the 1993
regulatory sample discussed in section III, agencies promulgated 309 final
rules, of which only thirty-seven were accompanied by a determination that
the rule would have a significant economic impact on a substantial number
of small entities. 173 The current approach contemplated in House Bill 682
would require the agency to determine at the time of periodic review
whether the rule has a significant economic impact on a substantial number
of small entities for purposes of determining whether section 610 review
was required, and it is likely that agencies would find roughly the same
proportion of rules to have such impact.174 Thus, even though it may be
reasonable to believe that reviewing a rule could impose some costs on
agencies, the simple fact is that the large majority of agency regulation
would not trigger section 610 review requirements.
Second, given agency regulatory goals, the most common outcome for a
notice and comment requirement would be that the agency would propose
very few changes. Subject to the arbitrary and capricious standard, the
agency would only update its estimates on how the rule is affecting small
entities, while providing discussion of regulatory alternatives to the status
quo and defensible reasons for not adopting those alternatives. This would
not require the same level of staff time as a substantive amendment to the
regulation, nor would it likely impose large publication costs. For those
few rules which would require in-depth consideration of alternatives and
adoption of a new regulatory approach, such rules would most likely be
central to the agency’s core mission and regulatory burdens, and section
610 review would not be likely to greatly increase their administrative
costs.
Finally, even should agencies reasonably believe that amendment of the
RFA as discussed will impose significant costs in some cases, these costs
must also be weighed against the nature of agency regulation. Federal
agency rules are not industry “best practices.” They are federal law, and
must be complied with by those who are regulated. A violation of these
rules carries civil and criminal penalties, and small entities with less
resources than federal agencies can quickly fall into traps for the unwary,
172. See 5 U.S.C. § 610(a); see also supra Part III.A.2.
173. See supra tbl. 1. The difference becomes even more apparent when the reader takes
into account the fact that the sample includes twenty-one separate notices from HHS for
what appears to be one very large food labeling action. See supra note 88.
174. H.R. 682, 109th Cong. § 7 (2005) (proposing § 610(e), mandating agencies to
publish a list of rules with significant economic impacts to substantial numbers of small
entities, without regard to whether they were accompanied by final regulatory flexibility
analyses when originally published).
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where they will not be permitted to plead that determination of their
responsibilities under the rules would have cost too much. As Congress
ultimately concluded during its consideration of the RFA:
The Committee is aware that the workload of some agencies may increase
during rulemaking. Such temporary increases in costs to the government
must be seen in the perspective of long-run reductions in cost to the
society, however. An agency which ignores less burdensome alternatives,
conversely, is in effect, putting a substantial cost upon certain individuals
and groups in the society. 175

Thus, citing the fundamental unfairness of a situation where agency
officials claim to lack the funds to determine the effects of their actions,
Congress enacted the RFA and chose to prohibit willful blindness. It
appears that even if the RFA should impose some costs on some agencies
for a handful of contentious rules, the agencies should respect Congress’
expressed will, and ensure that their actions do not unnecessarily harm
those who are least able to protect themselves.
b.

Effects of the Recommendation on the Predictability of Regulation

One interesting concern brought up by a solid periodic review
requirement is the role of predictability in the regulation of industry. A
rule may require large equipment or capital expenditures upfront, with
costs to be recovered slowly over the course of twenty or more years.
Again, a prominent example of a long-term regulatory requirement with
significant initial sunk costs is the recent nonroad diesel emissions rule
promulgated by the EPA. 176 This rule is estimated to cost engine and
equipment manufacturers approximately $1.3 billion in fixed costs, mainly
in retooling and redesign. 177 EPA weighs these costs over the agency’s
estimate of “recovered” costs over a period of thirty years. 178 If, after ten
years, EPA was required to reopen the rulemaking to public comment, and
the evidence showed that those capital expenditures were not likely to
reduce emissions, or that the types of pollution being reduced were not
actually as harmful as EPA had originally assumed, and EPA eliminated
the requirements, companies that had expended large amounts of capital at
the outset of the rule would be in a greatly reduced competitive position to
companies which had not. 179
175. S. REP. NO. 96-878, at 9 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2788, 2796.
176. EPA, CONTROL OF EMISSIONS, supra note 36, at 6-74, 77.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Although it may seem an ancillary concern, it could be important. After all, an
agency such as EPA, faced with a new periodic review requirement, may decide that the
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We must balance the concept of fair regulation of industries with the
underlying economic principles behind the feel-good goal of forcing the
government to refrain from imposing unnecessary burdens on small
entities. Judged from the point of view of existing companies, it would be
a fundamentally unfair market if they were forced to endure round after
round of massive capital expenditures which agencies later reduced, giving
competitors a cost advantage. The concept of free and competitive
markets, however, forces us to balance the economics of government
regulation. It is true that the RFA operates to force agencies to consider the
complaints of existing small entities of the type that commonly contact
their congressmen, and are glad to have the legal protections of the RFA
for their constituents. Protecting existing small entities, however, is not the
RFA’s only goal. Rather, the RFA operates as an important check to
government-produced barriers to market entry, and keeps our free markets
competitive and open to future entrepreneurs.180
Additionally, as a practical matter, protecting competition may serve to
protect small entities. Agencies do not regulate only small entities, but
entire industries. Generally, small firms represent over ninety-nine percent
of all firms, but due to their sheer size, the small proportion of large firms
actually account for almost half of nonfarm private gross domestic
product. 181 Allowing existing market players to claim the need for
predictability allows agencies to impose eternal high-cost regulations, and
has potential to allow large players to spread regulatory costs and prohibit
any entrepreneurial small firm from entering that market. This may not
only allow large firms to dominate industries due to their ability to better
spread regulatory costs, but it could hurt consumers by giving those large
firms more market power than they would have had if small company entry
were possible. Regulation serves as a way to protect large firms from the
smaller firms nipping at their heels.
Thus, the concept of predictability requires serious consideration.
Removing regulatory burdens after the expenditure of capital costs would
work a fundamental unfairness to the small entities that choose to stay in a
market, and may serve as a disincentive to them to stay when faced with
large regulatory costs. Allowing agencies to consider their existing
best way to impose regulatory requirements would be to impose the maximum amount of
regulatory costs immediately, rather than spread them over a term of years in which the
agency is not sure that it will be authorized to regulate.
180. See, e.g., George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 3, 7-9 (1971) (discussing capture of regulation by rail carriers to erect barriers
to entry for new trucking entrants).
181. Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Frequently Asked Questions 1 (2005),
http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/sbfaq.pdf.
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regulatory burden on industry as the “baseline,” however, could erect
barriers to entry by smaller firms who are not capable of spreading large
regulatory costs, and thus cause harm to both small entities and consumers.
The author believes that large-scale agency vacation of existing
regulatory standards is unlikely, regardless of whether agencies are
required to engage in notice and comment rulemaking. Agencies should be
expected to reduce burdens somewhat, but any regulatory relief would
probably not reach the level that would cause small entities to believe they
were unfairly forced to expend capital, or dissuade small entities from
remaining in markets upon learning of new regulation. Moreover,
meaningful review with public participation, of the sort that would be
guaranteed by notice and comment rulemaking, would bring such
competition issues to light.
c.

Timing Considerations in Notice and Comment Rulemaking

One important factor to consider in any notice and comment rulemaking
requirement would be timing. Has ten years proven to be a reasonable time
frame for review, or would some other time frame be more appropriate?
Also, section 610 currently states that agencies must conduct review ten
years after the rule is published as final.182 Many rules, however, such as
the EPA nonroad diesel rule discussed above, are implemented over the
course of many years, and regulatory burdens are sometimes not being
imposed until close to the time when the agency would be required to
conduct its ten year section 610 review. 183 Should agencies be forced to
review rules that have only been in effect for a year or two, or would it be
too confusing to tie the review period to dates that burdens are imposed?
Ten years appears to be an appropriate time frame for current reform
efforts. Using the language proposed here for amending section 610(b) to
clarify when the review period begins tolling, it would appear that a large
numbers of rules exist which would be required to be reviewed and would
likely occupy agency review personnel for the foreseeable future.184 Also,
ten years may seem like a long timeframe, but it is useful because a long
timeframe guarantees that any evolution of the regulation which could
occur has already done so. While it could be argued that after five or seven

182. 5 U.S.C. § 610(a) (2000).
183. For example, the EPA’s nonroad diesel emissions rule was promulgated on June 29,
2004, and required major reductions in particulate matter emissions from nonroad diesel
engines between twenty-five and seventy-five horsepower beginning in 2013. See EPA
Final Rule: Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Nonroad Diesel Engines and Fuel,
69 Fed. Reg. 38,958, 38,971 (June 29, 2004).
184. See supra Part VI.A.
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years, the rule’s impacts on small entities would be clear, after ten years,
almost all changes in compliance burdens due to litigation and agency
interpretations of a rule would surely have occurred. For the time being,
ten years would seem an appropriate time frame for review.
As far as when the ten-year period should begin, it appears that
publication may be the best compromise. It makes little sense to require a
periodic review of a regulatory burden that has only been in effect a year or
two. The rule’s effects are not yet quantifiable, small entities may not even
be aware of the rule’s requirements, and the regulation may experience
significant evolution due to agency interpretation or litigation that reduces
or increases its effects on small entities dramatically. Yet, it is difficult to
state that section 610 review should be conducted separately for individual
regulations on the event of their ten-year anniversaries. While it is usually
not a persuasive argument to claim that agencies should not be required to
conduct reviews due to limited resources, neither should the agencies be
required to conduct annual reviews for a single rulemaking, budgeting for
separate personnel to conduct each one, opening and closing comment
periods one after the other, and generally wasting the taxpayers’ money on
something that could have been done over the course of a few years. One
review for each rulemaking would appear appropriate, to be completed ten
years after the publication of the final rule in the Federal Register.
2.

Notice and Comment Rulemaking in Response to a Petition

As discussed above, mandatory notice and comment rulemaking in
response to section 610 reviews appears to be the only way to ensure
meaningful public participation, and such public reviews would not likely
present an unreasonable drain on agency resources. Should it appear,
however, that such an option would be overly burdensome or if it proves
likely to lead to regulatory mayhem, a variation on the idea could solve
concerns. Instead of requiring notice and comment every ten years for
every rulemaking which the agency determines has a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities, section 610 could be
revised to require notice and comment only in such cases where sufficient
interest exists to petition the agency for rulemaking. Such an option would
appear to be useful because it would: (1) reduce the number of rules treated
thusly, and hence, the cost to the reviewing agency, and (2) ensure public
participation for those rules which imposed sufficient burden on small
entities to petition for its change.
This option would appear to address any agency cost concerns about
opening section 610 reviews for public participation. As discussed above,
only a small percentage of rules each year are found by agencies to have
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significant economic impacts to a substantial number of small entities.185
Should this subset of rules be further limited to those rules for which the
agency receives a petition for notice and comment, it is likely that the
number of petitions in any given year would be quite small. It is instructive
to note the relatively small number of rules involved in responses to
OIRA’s calls for regulatory reform proposals. 186 Since many of the
proposals for reform received by OIRA over the past four years involve
rules which do not significantly affect small entities, agencies would be
likely to receive even fewer requests based on a revised section 610 than
they already currently receive through OIRA’s regulatory reform process.
Second, an option involving a basic petition based on specific
parameters would ensure that all issues with valid small entity concerns
were publicly addressed by an agency. The current APA petition process
would not ensure that agencies actually allow for public participation in
any more rulemakings than they already do, mainly because of the cost of
the process and the narrow standard of review for agency denials of such
petitions. 187 By adopting a standard form for petitions, and making it
mandatory for agencies to respond to such petitions with opportunities for
public participation, section 610 could ensure that agencies conduct
meaningful reviews of existing regulations.
An interesting question attached to this option is the following: Who
would actually petition agencies for the section 610 notice and comment
rulemaking? One possibility would be to simply adopt a provision similar
to the APA, allowing any party to petition the agency for section 610 notice
and comment process. 188 This would ensure the maximum number of
affected small entities had an opportunity to make themselves heard.

185. See supra Part III.A.2.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 57-66.
187. See e.g., WWHT v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 656 F.2d 807, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(“[T]he decision to institute rulemaking is one that is largely committed to the discretion of
the agency, and . . . the scope of review of such a determination must, of necessity, be very
narrow.”). Further, it is possible that small entities that did not participate in rulemakings
conducted more than ten years prior could later be blocked from raising arguments central to
the rulemaking in their petition. See, e.g., Nader v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 513 F.2d
1045, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“[I]t is incumbent ‘upon an interested person to act
affirmatively to protect himself’ in administrative proceedings, and ‘such a person should
not be entitled to sit back and wait until all interested persons who do so act have been
heard, and then complain that he has not been properly treated.’”) (quoting Red River
Broad. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 98 F.2d 282, 286 (1938)); Henley v. FDA, 873 F. Supp.
776, 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing to Nader in dicta, concluding that citizen petition brought
six years after completed rulemaking “essentially sought review” of a rule for which the
citizen did not originally participate).
188. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (“Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition
for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”)
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Limiting the petition right to an advocate for small business, however,
could have the effect of focusing the advocate’s attention on the petition
process and ensuring that at least one entity developed expertise in the
petition process. By designating an established small entity advocate, such
as the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA, section 610 could ensure
active pursuit of small entity reviews by an office of advocates who are in
continuous contact with regulated small entities. Either option appears to
have benefits, and neither presents any significant drawback, yet the option
of investing a permanent office within the federal government with the
responsibility and authority to file petitions for rulemaking on behalf of
small entities could be a slightly more reliable guarantee.
Hence, a slightly altered section 610(e) (with potential changes from the
language previously proposed in italics) would begin:
(e) Within one year of receipt of a petition from the chief counsel for
advocacy of the U.S. Small Business Administration, the agency shall
publish rules to be continued through notice and comment rulemaking
pursuant to section 553(b) of this title. 189

To reflect the difference between a ten-year mandatory review and a
review in response to petition, the proposed section (f) from Part VI.B.1
would also be revised (with potentially revised language in italics):
(f) Rules for which the agency has not published a general notice of
proposed rulemaking within 180 days and a final rule within twelve
months of receipt of a petition for rulemaking from the chief counsel for
advocacy of the U.S. Small Business Administration shall lapse and
become unenforceable. Provided, an agency may continue enforcement
of a lapsed rule once for a period of not more than twelve months from
the publication of a determination in the Federal Register stating that the
lapse of the rule would have a significant negative impact to human health
or safety, along with the factual basis for such determination. 190

This Article does not recommend a provision for notice and comment
periodic reviews only in response to petitions. As discussed above, such
petition-driven reviews would likely result in confusion and agency noncompliance, and notice and comment reviews would not overly tax agency
resources.
3.

Public Participation Through Mandatory Small Entity Review Panels

One way to ensure public participation would be the introduction of
small entity review panels for purposes of periodic review. Without
189. Cf. supra Part VI.B.1.
190. Cf. supra Part VI.B.1.
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concurrent adoption of notice and comment process in section 610 periodic
reviews, however, such panels would be likely to waste agency resources
and unlikely to result in regulatory burden reduction.
In 1996, Congress amended the RFA to require two agencies to conduct
small entity review panels for proposed rules. 191 These panels consist of
the agency, as well as representatives of the SBA’s Office of Advocacy and
OIRA, and are advised by small entity representatives from the affected
industries. These panels review pre-decisional proposals for regulation and
make recommendations for revisions to reduce small entity burdens, which
are indirectly judicially reviewable. 192
As discussed above, GAO’s study of more than fifty federal agencies
identified six that consistently had more than ten entries per year that were
identified as likely to impose significant economic impacts on a substantial
number of small entities. 193 Specifically, the GAO identified the
Departments of Commerce, the Interior, Treasury, and Health and Human
Services, the Small Business Administration, the Federal Communications
Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. 194 Singling
out these agencies, in a fashion similar to 1996 RFA amendments’
treatment of small entity review panels, would reduce potentially
unnecessary administrative burdens to less active agencies while ensuring
that the majority of rulemakings have some public participation and reach
judicially reviewable and public decisions.
This idea has merit, but also presents a number of problems. First, small
entity review panels consume vast agency resources, and would likely
overwhelm not only the agencies, but also the small staffs of both the
SBA’s Office of Advocacy and OIRA. 195 As federal personnel became
less able to devote time to the panels, small entity review panels could lose
their main recommending benefit, which is that they provide for the in-

191. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-121, §
244(a), 110 Stat. 847, 867-68 (1996) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 609 (1996)).
192. 5 U.S.C. §§ 609(b), 611(a) (2000).
193. GAO, AGENCIES’ INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 82, at 13-14.
194. Id. at 14.
195. This is a serious concern. For example, the Office of Advocacy currently has fewer
than fifteen attorneys devoted to reviewing every federal agency’s compliance with the
RFA, who handle less than a handful of small entity review panels each year. See Office of
Advocacy,
Small
Bus.
Admin.,
Advocacy
Staff
List,
available
at
http://www.sba.gov/advo/staff.html. OIRA has a similar level of staffing. GAO,
RULEMAKING: OMB’S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND THE
TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS 19, fig.2 (2003) (“Organization of OIRA”), available at
http://www.gao.gov (search “GAO-03-929”). This would not appear to be an adequate
staffing level to absorb the responsibility of dozens of additional panels without drastically
reducing the level of participation each office currently provides.
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depth exchange of technical and economic data between small entities and
agency officials.
Second, without an attached rulemaking, small entity review panels
would be simple collectors of information, issuing a report which has no
meaning and could not be meaningfully reviewed by a court. Currently,
the small entity review panel reviews a regulatory approach the agency has
not yet published as a proposed rule. The panel serves as a check on the
rule before it is made public. If there is no regulatory approach being
considered, and no required post-panel rulemaking, the panel itself
becomes an academic exercise, unlikely to spur agency action. In addition,
small entity representatives would be hesitant to devote resources to such
an exercise. Granted, the RFA could be amended to also require a notice
and comment rulemaking, but this begs the following question: If the
agency is already required to open the rule to public participation through
notice and comment rulemaking, is a small entity review panel going to
provide for justifiably increased small entity participation?
Third, even though GAO identified six agencies as particularly active,
other agencies occasionally impose massive burdens on small entities. For
example, one of the smallest federal agencies, the Architectural and
Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (“Access Board”), sets the
architectural standards that small entities must attain in public
accommodations and commercial facilities to be considered accessible
under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 196 The agency regulates very
infrequently, but when it does adjust its standards, regulated industries
estimate that the Access Board’s rule changes could cost billions of dollars
to small entities.197 Expanding the panel requirement to all agencies would
completely overwhelm both the Office of Advocacy and OIRA. A petition
provision could require an agency to convene a small entity review panel in
response to petitions, but such petitions would be unlikely to be used, as the
current lack of petitions for section 610 review can attest. Given the
questions which would remain as to the implementation and cost of small
entity review panels for the purpose of periodic review, it would appear
more cost-effective, and in keeping with the burden-reduction goals of the
RFA, to introduce a basic requirement for the notice and comment process,
rather than to expand section 609’s review panel requirement into the realm

196. 29 U.S.C. § 792(b)(3) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12204 (2000).
197. See Letter from Thomas M. Sullivan, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Bus.
Admin., to Alexander Acosta, Assistant Attorney Gen. for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice
(May
23,
2005),
available
at
http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/comments/doj05_0523.pdf (discussing the potential costs of
the rule and citing to industry studies).
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of periodic review. Should Congress later determine that notice and
comment procedures were not encouraging agencies to reduce regulatory
burdens, small entity review panels could be added to existing notice and
comment process in periodic reviews.
4. Combined Section 610 and Paperwork Reduction Act Reviews into
Single Interagency Review Overseen by Both OMB and the SBA’s Office of
Advocacy
A third possible reform proposal to ensure public participation arises
from the need to ensure that agencies conduct meaningful reviews of rules,
and act when necessary, but stay within budget parameters. Notice and
comment rulemaking, as described in option one, is open to the public, and
is likely to result in policy decisions that properly balance competing
interests. Notice and comment rulemaking can be expensive in some cases,
however, and could require major devotion of agency resources for the
purposes of periodic review. If a more streamlined and less costly
approach could be found which did not sacrifice too much public
participation, such an option might be preferable to notice and comment
rulemaking. One possible solution could be to tie section 610 reviews to
reviews already being conducted by OMB under its information collection
request renewal process, but this idea does not seem to bear out on further
examination.
OMB is required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) to
review existing regulatory paperwork burdens with an eye towards
minimizing them. 198 To this end, OMB’s regulations require agencies to
resubmit their information collection requests to OMB review and public
comment every three years. 199 During this process, OMB reviews the rule
for at least sixty days. Further, agencies are required to make a “reasonable
effort” to seek public comment prior to submitting the collection of
information to OMB for review, and must publish a notice in the Federal
Register at the same time the rule is sent to OMB, requesting the public’s
input and directing it to OMB. 200
Incorporating section 610 reviews into this process could help to ensure
that section 610 reviews are meaningful and public. OMB’s ample
oversight authority under the PRA, and its expertise in reviewing agency
regulatory alternatives under Executive Order 12,866 could make it an
198. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. § 3504 (2000).
199. OMB Controlling Paperwork Burdens on the Public, 5 C.F.R. §§ 1320.11(j) (2006)
(restricting collection of information approvals to three years in duration), 1320.12(e)(1)
(setting the length of a collection of information renewal at three years).
200. 5 C.F.R. §§ 1320.12(a)(2), 1320.12(c).
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effective and helpful partner in section 610 review. Also, by combining the
notice requirement of OMB’s PRA review with a notice of section 610
review, agencies would provide effective notice that a section 610 review
was imminent. Finally, the SBA’s Office of Advocacy, an office that
works closely with small business groups, would represent small business
concerns during any interagency discussions on the section 610 review.
The review periods do not match perfectly (three years for the PRA 201 and
ten for the RFA 202), but the difference is minor, as initiating a section 610
review in the ninth year of a rule’s effectiveness would ensure that rules did
not exceed ten years of effectiveness before they were reviewed.
There are multiple drawbacks, however, to such an approach. First and
foremost, without further regulation by OMB, there would be no
requirement that agencies issue final regulatory actions in response to
section 610 reviews. Agencies could continue to perform section 610
reviews without public participation.
Second, should small entities feel that the final product (or lack of final
product) of such a review was arbitrary or capricious, there is no recourse
under the PRA for judicial review. 203 This is no minor matter, as agencies
routinely ignored the RFA’s requirements until it was amended in 1996 to
provide small entities with the express authority to make a claim against an
agency. 204
Third, though the Office of Advocacy’s involvement could help
represent small entity interests in the interagency review process, that
process would remain confidential and exempt from the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). All documents produced during the discussions
would presumably remain out of the reach of the public, and under FOIA,
OMB and the Office of Advocacy would be prohibited from sharing with
the public the actual regulatory alternatives the agency put forward without
the agency’s express written authorization. 205
201. 44 U.S.C. § 3507(g) (2000).
202. 5 U.S.C. § 610(a).
203. 44 U.S.C. § 3507(d)(6) (“The decision by the Director [of the Office of Management
and Budget] to approve or not act upon a collection of information contained in an agency
rule shall not be subject to judicial review.”); see also Tozzi v. EPA, 148 F. Supp. 2d 35, 4748 (D.D.C. 2001) (dismissing a challenge to an Information Collection Request approval
decision, citing statutory bar to review).
204. See, e.g., Unanimous Consent Request, 142 CONG. REC. S1636-01, S1637 (Mar. 7,
1996) (statement of Senator Bond in support of scheduling a vote on the 1996 SBREFA
amendments to the RFA, concluding that, “[r]egulatory agencies have routinely ignored the
impact on small business . . . . We need to give them some enforcement powers so that they
will be heard.”), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/bb_s1636.html.
205. See Wolfe v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 839 F.2d 768, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(agency documents forwarded to OMB for approval were subject to deliberative process
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Fourth, the PRA and Executive Order 12,866 do not appear to grant
OMB sufficient authority in the case of independent regulatory agencies,
such as the Federal Communications Commission and the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The PRA itself provides that an independent
agency can override an OMB disapproval of an information collection.206
Further, these agencies are not subject to OMB review under Executive
Order 12,866. 207
Finally, such an approach would be of limited value for rules that do not
impose paperwork burdens and are not subject to regular review under the
PRA. For example, environmental restrictions on development or
requirements to make public facilities handicapped-accessible may not
require approvals of collections of information, as no information is
actually collected. In both instances, however, small entities would still
shoulder regulatory burdens subject to section 610 review.
This option has much to recommend it, in that it offers partners with
sufficient expertise to oversee agency compliance with section 610. Also,
the existing public notice process for PRA review could be adapted to
include section 610 notices for better public participation at reduced costs
from stand-alone agency section 610 notices. The approach’s many
shortcomings, however, not the least of which being that the PRA does not
apply to all agency actions, means that it would be better to ensure public
participation through an APA public notice and comment procedure, rather
than through PRA’s information collection review procedure. Therefore,
this Article does not recommend this option as a stand-alone response to
agency failures to reduce regulatory burdens, though OIRA’s PRA reviews
and periodic reviews could be combined with the recommended notice and
comment periodic review to ensure that federal officers outside the
regulatory agencies participated more fully in the periodic review process.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article attempts to describe the widespread agency noncompliance
with section 610 of the RFA, analyze current efforts to reform the
provision, and put forth several methods for improving agency compliance
and reduction of small entity regulatory burdens. House Bill 682 and
Senate Bill 1388 represent reasonable efforts to solve problems with
privilege and not properly released); see generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FOIA Guide:
Deliberative
Process
Privilege
(2004),
http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/exemption5.htm#deliberative.
206. 44 U.S.C. § 3507(f) (2000).
207. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,737 (Sept. 30, 1993)
(exempting independent agencies, defined in then-44 U.S.C. § 3502(10)).

Comment [XP1]: Can you clarify the assertion
being made here? I find it a little confusing…
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widespread agency refusal to complete section 610 reviews, and bear
promise for reforming the contents of the small entity periodic review. The
additional amendments recommended in this Article include: (1)
clarification of the time when a rule must be reviewed to eliminate
confusion concerning the effects of subsequent amendment on a final rule’s
periodic review, and (2) requiring notice and comment rulemaking for
continuation of rules through periodic review, attached to a concrete
timetable for such review. The adoption of House Bill 682 and Senate Bill
1388, along with the additional recommendations made here, will
invigorate the periodic review requirement of the RFA, and ensure that
agencies rationally evaluate their existing regulatory burden on American
small business.

